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Abstract 
 
This report analyses the role of multinational R&D intensive firms in job polarization. It 
also investigates how these firms affect the labour market in terms of wage growth 
and labour mobility. 
Firms appearing on the EU Industrial R&D Investment Scoreboard account for a 
significant share of economic activity in Denmark measured by employment, 
innovation activity, and R&D expenditures. Domestic firms listed on the scoreboard 
are the largest and most innovative, but subsidiaries of foreign scoreboard firms are 
still larger and more innovative compared to non-scoreboard firms. 
Relying on information from register data the report demonstrates that R&D spending 
among scoreboard firms is a complement to high skill jobs, while it substitutes low 
skill jobs. Thus, scoreboard firms are more involved in upgrading than polarization. 
Organisational change has an effect similar to that of R&D, while there is indication 
that innovation is a complement for low skilled jobs. Labour flows, particularly of high 
skilled workers, are stronger among scoreboard firms than between scoreboard firms 
and other firms. Thus, labour flows in networks instead of appearing in labour market 
pools, and non-scoreboard firms are kept out of the “knowledge spill-over” loops, 
providing them with fewer opportunities to learn from the scoreboard firms. 
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Executive summary 
A large share of R&D spending is limited to a relative small set of multinational firms, 
which tend to be among the largest employers in any given economy. Given their role 
as magnets for (high skilled) labour it is expected that these firms pay an important 
role in the pattern of polarization in the reorganisation of skills and jobs in the current 
European context. This report aims to provide new evidence on these major 
challenges facing Europe, and to formulate some recommendations for policy. The 
new evidence will come from statistical and econometric analyses on data from the 
firms retrieved from the EU Industrial R&D Investment Scoreboard (SB firms). This 
data is merged with registry data covering the entire Danish economy in terms of 
firms, workplaces and employed persons, and combined with survey data on private 
sector R&D and innovation. The registry and survey data are administered by 
Statistics Denmark (DST). The SB firms account for large shares of private sector R&D 
and innovation, and are world-leaders in these terms. Given their dominant position in 
the organisational landscape, it is important to understand their role in the 
reorganisation of skills and jobs within f irms and on the labour market. These data will 
enable a detailed investigation of the impact of multinational R&D spending firms on 
the current trend of job polarization eroding jobs with middle skill level, and on 
mobility of employees and innovation in the current global economic context 
The report documents that firms listed on the EU Industrial R&D Investment 
Scoreboard account for a signif icant share of economic activity in Denmark measured 
by employment, as well as a major share of innovation activity measure by the 
propensity to introduce new products and services, and measured by R&D 
expenditures. The average SB firm or subsidiary is quite different from the average 
non-SB firm, and within SB firms and subsidiaries there are large differences between 
the domestic SB firms and their subsidiaries in Denmark, and the subsidiaries in 
Denmark of foreign SB firms. Highlights from the descriptive analysis of SB firms and 
subsidiaries in Denmark include: 
 SB firms and subsidiaries pay higher average wages across all occupational 
groups 
 SB f irms and subsidiaries account for a disproportionate share of employment 
around the Danish capital region but also in some peripheral regions. 
 SB f irms exhibit a home bias in the sense that they tend to locate R&D 
activities and subsidiaries in their home country. Therefore the domestic SB 
firms R&D activities differ from the foreign SB firms in Denmark 
 SB firms are defined as firms with large scale R&D, and their R&D is shown to 
be high also in relative terms. They are also more innovative, especially 
regarding the introduction of new products and services. 
The general trend in the Danish economy is towards polarizatio n in jobs, where jobs 
that are middling in terms of skills and wages tend to disappear and High and Low 
jobs become more abundant. However, the detailed analyses in this report focus 
specifically on changes in the private sector from 2012 to 2013, which shows general 
upgrading of jobs, where Low jobs decline in share while High and to a lesser extent 
Middling jobs become relatively more abundant. This change is particularly strong 
among the firms that appear on the EU Industrial R&D Investment Scoreboard and 
their subsidiaries. These few hundred firms account for more than 10 percent of total 
private sector employment in Denmark and almost two thirds of private sector R&D in 
Denmark. The main results from the econometric analysis of the role of SB firms in job 
polarization can be summarized as: 
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 Depending on perspective, the change in job structure among SB firms can 
better be described as skill biased or general upgrading rather than polarizing 
since high wage/skill jobs are created at the expense of lower skill/wage jobs 
 SB f irms and their subsidiaries R&D expenditures complement High jobs while 
substituting Low jobs 
 For domestic SB firms and their subsidiaries internationalisation (measured by 
imports and exports) also complement High while substituting Low. 
 Innovation among SB f irms and subsidiaries in the sense of introducing new 
products or services, applying new production methods or new marketing 
approaches have uncertain effects that further analyses must clarify. The 
results in the present report show no effect or that innovation is a source of 
inclusive development in that it complements Low jobs. 
 Organisational changes within SB firms and subsidiaries have complicated 
effects on jobs depending on the dimension along which the organisational 
change is observed. In general, however, organisational changes are a source 
of general upgrading. 
The descriptive statistics show that wages are higher in SB firms and subsidiaries and 
this is substantiated by the econometric analyses: wage growth is higher in these 
firms and workers moving to such firms will on average experience a significant 
increase in wage. In addition, the SB firms and subsidiaries to some degree form a 
sub labour market within the labour market in the sense that workers exhibit higher 
mobility within this group of firms than between this group and the rest of the labour 
market. Highlights from the econometric analysis of the employees at SB firms and 
subsidiaries include: 
 High-skilled workers are more inclined to work for SB firms and subsidiaries, 
most likely because they also offer considerable better wages. 
 (High-Skilled) Labour is inclined to move between SB firms and subsidiaries 
rather than between these firms and other firms in the economy. This indicates 
that instead of labour market pools, it is more useful to think more about 
labour flow networks. 
 Non-SB firms are to a larger extent kept out of the “knowledge spill-over” 
loops, which provides them with fewer opportunities to learn from the SB firms. 
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1. Introduction 
A large share of a R&D spending is limited to a relative small set of firms, which tend 
to be among the largest in any given economy. Given their role as magnets for (high 
skilled) labour it is expected that these firms pay an important role in the 
reorganisation of skills and jobs. However, there is shortage of evidence on how these 
firms impact in the current European context of relocation of production and 
distributed research and development (R&D). This report aims to provide new 
evidence on these major challenges facing Europe, and to formulate some 
recommendations for policy. The new evidence will come from statistical and 
econometric analyses on data from the firms that constitute the EU Industrial R&D 
Investment Scoreboard (SB firms) combined with registry data covering the entire 
Danish economy in terms of firms, workplaces and employed persons, and combined 
with survey data on private sector R&D and innovation. The registry and survey data 
are from Statistics Denmark (DST). The SB firms account for large shares of private 
sector R&D and innovation, and are world-leaders in these terms. Given their 
dominant position in the organisational landscape, it  is important to understand their 
role in the reorganisation of skills and jobs. These data will enable a detailed 
investigation of the impact of multinational R&D spending firms on job polarization, 
mobility of employees and innovation in the current global economic context 
The report has an emphasis on the role played by the SB firms in the Danish 
economy. SB firms are by definition R&D intensive firms and thus supposed to have a 
high impact on the economies of the home countries and other countries in which they 
have subsidiaries. In this report, we make a distinction between three groups of firms: 
domestic SB firms and their subsidiaries, foreign subsidiaries and non-SB firms.  
The final report is prepared in collaboration with the European Commission Joint 
Research Centre, Territorial Development Unit, Economics of Industrial Research and 
Innovation (JRC-B3-IRITEC) in accordance with the technical specifications 
(Ares(2016) 6286869) of Purchase Order B.B650165 “Study on skills, innovation, and 
reorganization of labour: Evidence from Denmark”.1 
 
1.1 Research questions 
The report documents that the firms appearing on the EU Industrial R&D Investment 
Scoreboard account for a signif icant share of economic activity in Denmark measured 
by employment, as well as a major share of innovation activity measure by the 
propensity to introduce new products and services, and measured by R&D 
expenditures. The average SB firm or subsidiary is quite different from the average 
non-SB firm, and within SB firms and subsidiaries there are large differences between 
the domestic SB firms and their subsidiaries in Denmark, and the subsidiaries in 
Denmark of foreign SB firms. The difference between subsidiaries in Denmark of 
domestic and foreign SB f irms demonstrates a considerable home bias as domestic SB 
firms focus their activities disproportionately in Denmark. Thus, a relatively small 
number of large and innovative firms seem to play a dominating role on the evolution 
of the Danish economy. Additionally, there is unambiguous evidence of urbanisation 
and job polarisation trends in Denmark in recent years. These trends are continuations 
of longer trends and they are intertwined with technological change and globalisation 
(Keller and Utar, 2016; OECD, 2017), deindustrialisation (Bernard et al., 2016) and 
the pattern of labour market flows (Eurofound, 2017). But despite that these SB firms 
                                        
1 The focus on Denmark entails that all monetary values are converted to Euros using the 
exchange rate of 7.46 DKK/Euro, which is the central peg in the Exchange Rate Mechanism. 
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are large employers, with an ability to attract high-skilled labour; the role of SB firms 
in these trends is unknown. This report focusses on two general research questions: 
1. What is the role of SB firms and their subsidiaries in the recent job polarization 
trend observed in the Danish economy? 
2. How do SB firms and subsidiaries affect the Danish labour market in terms of 
wage growth and labour mobility? 
SB firms and their subsidiaries are different from non-SB firms in various ways that 
ideally should be accounted for when analysing the data. Some differences are 
observable to researchers while others are not . The observed variables include the 
frequency of innovation, the level of R&D expenditures, the degree to which the firm is 
part of a global value chain etc. The effects of these observed factors can be analysed 
directly, unlike unobserved differences. However, it is also expected that there are 
such unobserved differences between SB f irms and their subsidiaries, and other firms; 
i.e. difference that the data cannot account for. In such cases, it is necessary to rely 
on simply distinguishing SB firms and subsidiaries from other firms as proxy for these 
differences. Similarly, it is expected that there are both observed and unobserved 
differences between domestic SB firms and their subsidiaries compared to subsidiaries 
of foreign SB f irms. Such differences can be driven by the above mentioned home bias 
whereby domestic SB firms locate activities in separate firms, which are nonetheless 
spatially close to the parent firm. 
Firms’ workforce composition and factors leading to change therein will be analysed 
econometrically when studying job polarisation. This is elaborated below. When 
studying SB firms and subsidiaries’ effect on the Danish labour market it is necessary 
to study labour market dynamics among employees of SB f irms and subsidiaries 
relative to employees at other firms. In order for such an analysis t o be robust these 
groups need to be matched. This methodology is explained shortly in connection with 
the presentation of the analyses in Section 5.5. 
The present report is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the relevant overall 
trends in the Danish economy, while the SB f irms and subsidiaries in Denmark are 
presented in greater detail in Section 3. Section 4 is a descriptive analysis of 
employment and R&D across Denmark while section 5 presents the econometric 
analysis of the above research questions. Section 6 concludes the report and sums up. 
2 Macro trends in Denmark 
As many other developed countries, the Danish economy exhibits trends towards 
deindustrialisation, urbanisation around the larger university cities and job polarization 
where middle wage jobs disappear while low and high wage jobs become more 
abundant. These trends are closely linked: manufacturing tends to locate outside cities 
and provide middle-wage jobs. The deindustrialisation and job polarization trends for 
Denmark are recently documented using employer and employee level registry data 
by Keller and Utar (2016) and Bernard et al. (2016). 
 
2.1 Job polarization 
The job polarization literature generally groups jobs into three categories: Low, 
Middling and High wage/skill jobs, and polarization is then the trend that the share of 
Middling jobs is decreasing while the shares of Low and High-wage jobs are increasing. 
Goos et al. (2014) is a recent example of this literature documenting the 
pervasiveness of job polarization across European countries, including Denmark. 
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According to Goos and colleagues the share of Middling jobs in Denmark dropped by 
10.3 percentage points from 1993 to 2010, while the shares of Low and High jobs 
increased by 1.73 and 8.56 percentage points respectively.  
However, Fernández-Macías (2012) demonstrates that the polarization pattern is 
sensitive to the grouping of jobs into the three categories.  Fernández-Macías (2012) 
concludes that, among EU15 countries, the polarization trend is limited to 
West/Continental countries while the opposite trend is observed among Mediterranean 
countries and the trend in Northern countries, including Denmark, can best be 
described as general upgrading, where no job categories decline in absolute terms, 
but High wage jobs grow in relative terms.2 
 
Table 1 – Classification of occupations 
First digit of 
ISCO-08 
ISCO-08 label  Group 
Median hourly 
wage 
1 Managers High 
  
41.96 
2 Professionals High 
  
31.90 
3 
Technicians and Associate 
Professionals 
High 
  
29.62 
4 Clerical Support Workers 
 
Middling 
 
25.07 
5 Services and Sales Workers 
  
Low 22.25 
7 
Craft and Related Trades 
Workers  
Middling 
 
26.94 
8 
Plant and Machine 
Operators and Assemblers  
Middling 
 
26.54 
9 Elementary Occupations 
  
Low 22.39 
Source: Based on table 1 of Goos et al. (2014) combined with own calculations. 
Note: Median wages in Euro/hour computed for the entire Danish labour market in 2010 from DST’s 
registry data. 
 
This report will focus on polarization along the lines of the general job polarization 
literature, here exemplified by Goos et al. (2014). The same categorisation of jobs is 
applied making the analysis comparable to earlier studies. This entails using the 
categorization illustrated in Table 1 mapping jobs into High, Middling and Low from the 
first digit of the jobs’ International Standard Classification of Occupations (ISCO-08) 
code from the International Labor Association. 
Skilled agricultural, forestry and f ishery workers (ISCO-08: 6) along with armed forces 
(ISCO-08: 0) are excluded from the analysis because few private sector jobs are 
classified in these occupational groups. The categorization of occupations in Goos et 
al. (2014) based solely on a ranking of occupations by median wage at the two-digit 
ISCO level, but the resulting delimitations of the groups follow the one-digit level.  To 
assess the validity of the ranking it is ascertained that it applies to our data, cf. Table 
1. 3  As mentioned, Fernández-Macías (2012) demonstrated the sensitivity of the 
                                        
2 The UK and Ireland are partially showing upgrading and partially showing polarization. 
3 An individual’s wage in the registry data is the average hourly compensation before taxes 
including any extra supplement, bonuses etc. 
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conclusions to applying the pattern of Table 1; a concern that is augmented by the 
fact that wages are generally higher in SB firms compared to non-SB firms. Therefore, 
Table 2 shows the median wage for 24 occupational groups: the eight groups included 
in the categorisation in Table 1, sub-divided into domestic SB, foreign SB and non-SB 
private sector firms. 
 
Table 2 - Wage hierarchy  
Occupation SB Type 
Median hourly 
wage 
Group 
1. Managers Domestic 56.57 
 1. Managers Foreign 52.95 
 2. Professionals  Foreign 42.63 
 2. Professionals  Domestic 41.02 
 1. Managers 
 
40.62 
 3. Technicians and Associate Professionals  Foreign 35.92 
 3. Technicians and Associate Professionals  Domestic 32.04 
 2. Professionals  
 
31.37 
 7. Craft and Related Trades Workers  Foreign 30.29 
 7. Craft and Related Trades Workers  Domestic 30.16 
 3. Technicians and Associate Professionals    29.09 High 
8. Plant and Machine Operators and Assemblers  Domestic 28.15 Middling 
4. Clerical Support Workers  Domestic 27.61 
 
7. Craft and Related Trades Workers 
 
26.68 
 
8. Plant and Machine Operators and Assemblers  
 
26.54 
 
9. Elementary Occupations  Domestic 26.41 
 
8. Plant and Machine Operators and Assemblers  Foreign 26.27 
 
9. Elementary Occupations  Foreign 25.87 
 
5. Services and Sales Workers  Foreign 25.74 
 
5. Services and Sales Workers  Domestic 25.74 
 
4. Clerical Support Workers  
 
24.93 
 
4. Clerical Support Workers  Foreign 24.66 Middling 
5. Services and Sales Workers  
 
22.12 Low 
9. Elementary Occupations    22.12   
Source: DST’s registry data. 
Note: Median wages in 2010 Euro/hour. Blank for SB Type means non-SB private sector 
 
Table 2 shows that median wage is highest for managers at domestic SB firms and 
their subsidiaries. A potential explanation that these wages are higher compared to 
foreign SB subs idiaries might be the result of a “home bias” and subsequent 
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headquarter dominance in the upper echelon of the organization’s work force . 
Applying the threshold between High and Middling jobs implied by Table 1 at around 
28-29 euro/hour means that craft related occupations at SB subsidiaries (both 
domestic and foreign) could be included among High jobs. Craft related occupations at 
SB subsidiaries have a wage that is comparable to the wage of technicians in non-SB 
firms, which could - arguably - even be placed in the group of Middling occupations 
with a median wage of only 29 euro/hour. Furthermore, applying the threshold 
between Middling and Low jobs at around 23-24 euro/hour (as implied by Table 1) 
entails that only non-SB jobs in service, sales and elementary occupations should be 
considered Low jobs. However, in order to make the analysis comparable to other 
studies, this study relies on the categorisation presented in Table 1. 
Figure 1 illustrates the trend for job polarization in Denmark. A clear shift from 
Middling to Low occupations can be observed with only a minor increase in the share 
of High occupations in the years leading up to 2013, and even a slight decline from 
2012 to 2013 in the share of High. In fact, only one of the three occupational groups 
classified as High (cf. Table 1) actually increases over the period, namely ISCO-08: 2, 
Professionals (not shown).  
 
Figure 1 – Job polarization. Share of total employment by occupation 
 
Source: DST’s registry data. 
 
 
2.2 Urbanisation 
Economic activity in Denmark is centred around the four largest Danish cities Aalborg, 
Odense, Aarhus and Copenhagen or, in terms that are more general: along the 
eastern coast of the mainland (Jutland) and around Copenhagen, see Figure 2. The 
figure groups the municipalities of Denmark into four socio-economic groups and 
Copenhagen. The grouping is taken from the review of Nordic regional definitions 
given in Damsgaard (2010) and is based on 14 indicators describing the local labour 
market, infrastructure, income, and demographics.4  Each urban municipality has a 
                                        
4 See p. 4 of Damsgaard (2010) for details. 
25
27
29
31
33
35
37
2010 2011 2012 2013
High Middling Low
Linear (High) Linear (Middling) Linear (Low)
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central urban zone, but Copenhagen presents a special case by being one large urban 
zone spanning many municipalities. To account for this, Copenhagen is treated 
separately and it is defined as the NUTS 3 regions 11 and 12 (see below for details on 
NUTS 3). 
 
Figure 2 - Socio-economic grouping of regions in Denmark 
 
Source: Classification from Damsgaard (2010). 
 
The socio-economic grouping of F igure 2 summarises the economic topography of 
Denmark giving a general picture of the spatial distribution of economic activity. 
However, a more internationally recognisable classification is the NUTS 3 classification, 
which will be used when describing the spatial distribution of SB f irms’ activities in 
Denmark. The 11 NUTS 3 regions of Denmark are illustrated in Figure 3, and when 
comparing to Figure 2 it can be seen which are the economic centres. 
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Figure 3 - NUTS 3 regions in Denmark 
 
 
Table 3 shows the geographic distribution of subsidiaries compared to other private 
firms in the economy in terms of full-time equivalent (FTE) employment.  
 
Table 3 - Regional characteristics 
 
Subsidiaries of 
foreign SB firms 
Domestic SB firms and 
their subsidiaries 
Other private firms in 
Denmark NUTS 3 
DK011 Copenhagen City 18.15 11.15 16.32 
DK012 Copenhagen surroundings 24.49 30.08 12.26 
DK013 North Zealand 6.08 8.53 5.97 
DK014 Bornholm 0.12 0.08 0.55 
DK021 East Zealand 2.57 0.54 3.64 
DK022 West and South Zealand 5.01 5.75 7.22 
DK031 Funen 4.33 2.61 7.55 
DK032 South Jutland 11.80 14.85 13.45 
DK041 West Jutland 7.13 12.41 7.88 
DK042 East Jutland 11.75 9.58 15.21 
DK050 North Jutland 8.57 4.43 9.95 
Socio-economic region group    
1. Copenhagen 42.65 41.22 28.57 
2. Urban 27.38 21.58 26.57 
3. Intermediate 10.1 5.3 12.43 
4. Rural  17.28 26.16 24.97 
5. Remote 2.58 5.73 7.46 
Source: Computed from DST’s registries and SB data. 
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Not surprisingly, a high share of these subsidiaries is located in and around the main 
economic centre of Denmark, Copenhagen. There also appears to be an 
overrepresentation of SB subsidiaries in the area north of Copenhagen and sizeable 
representations of domestic SB subsidiaries in the west and south of Jutland, which 
are otherwise considered relatively marginal regions, cf. Figure 2. The second panel of 
Table 3 divides regions in urban, intermediate, rural and remote areas. An interesting 
observation is again the relative strong presence of domestic SB subsidiaries in rural 
areas. 
Figure 4 shows the urbanization trend in Denmark. Remote, rural and intermediate 
regions all share a common slightly declining trend and have therefore been grouped 
together. Despite the declining trend, they still account for more than 40 percent of 
employment in Denmark. The employment growth trend in urban regions is flat while 
the share of jobs in the Copenhagen region is increasing. 
 
Figure 4 - Urbanisation. Share of total employment by municipality type 
 
Source: Computed from DST’s registry data. 
 
 
3 The scoreboard firms 
The report is studying skills, innovation and reorganization of labour based on Danish 
data with a specific emphasis on the role played by firms that are part of the EU 
Industrial R&D Investment Scoreboard. Hence, the data are a combination of data on 
the SB firms, registry data covering the entire Danish economy in terms of firms, 
workplaces and workers, and survey data on firms’ R&D and innovation related 
activities. This means that the analysis will be between three different levels as 
illustrated in Figure 5. 
The highest aggregate level is the level of SB firms. The SB firms are identified 
through the EU Industrial R&D Investment Scoreboard data. Information on the 
subsidiaries of these top R&D spenders was obtained directly from Bureau Van Dijk, 
using the corporate structure of the SB firms at the end of 2015. This data connects 
each SB firm to a number of Danish subsidiaries (i.e. VAT numbers) some of which 
20
25
30
35
40
45
50
2010 2011 2012 2013
4. Urban 5. Copenhagen 1. Rem/2. Rur/3. Int
Linear (4. Urban) Linear (5. Copenhagen) Linear (1. Rem/2. Rur/3. Int)
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exist only one year, have no employees and no economic activity, while others exist 
for longer timespans and have actual economic activity. Only the latter will appear in 
our registry data. 
 
Figure 5 - The levels in the data 
 
 
With the SB data, it is possible to link domestic and foreign SB firms to subsidiaries in 
Denmark so that the term “SB firm” refers to the conglomerate. The average SB 
firm/conglomerate consists of three subsidiary firms in Denmark. The domestic SB 
firms generally have more subsidiaries in Denmark than foreign firms do. However, 
subsidiaries of domestic SB firms include the SB firms themselves; i.e. the parent 
firm. This and several other empirical discrepancies between foreign and domestic SB 
firms entail that we will distinguish between these two groups. 
In principle, there are three types of SB firm subsidiaries but the data do not 
distinguish explicitly between them:  
1) The domestic SB firms and their subsidiaries, such as the largest R&D spender in 
Denmark the pharmaceutical company Novo Nordisk.  
2) Firms acquired by a SB firm with either a competence-exploiting motive or a 
competence-creating motive. These are firms in Denmark that have been acquired by 
foreign or domestic SB firms for e.g. access to the intellectual property, such as the 
large Danish ingredients firm Danisco that was acquired by DuPont for 5.4 billion euro 
in 2011.   
3) Greenfield SB subsidiaries. These include competence exploiting subsidiaries set up 
by foreign SB firms for access to the Danish or EU markets, such as the Norwegian oil 
and gas company Statoil; competence creating subsidiaries set up in order to have 
R&D activities present in Denmark, such as Intel. 
The third level in the data consists of workplaces. While “SB firms” are conglomerates 
and “subsidiary firms” are single legal units a “workplace” is the workplace in a 
Scoreboard firm/Multinational 
conglomerate. Domestic or foreign 
Subsidiary in Denmark 
A Danish firm/legal unit 
(Own Danish VAT number) 
… … 
Workplace/plant  
(Employees) 
Workplace/plant  
(Employees) 
Non-SB firm 
A Danish firm/legal unit 
(Own Danish VAT number) 
… 
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geographical location to which employees are associated. 5  Each subsidiary firm 
consists of on average 4-5 workplaces with average FTE employment of roughly 50 or 
100 for workplaces under foreign subsidiaries and domestic SB f irms and their 
subsidiaries respectively, making them much larger than the average workplace in the 
remaining private sector, cf. Table 7 below. Workplaces under SB firms and 
subsidiaries are larger and have almost as high labour turnover as non-SB workplaces 
(cf. later) suggesting that they can have a substantial impact on mobility and wage 
determination in the labour market. 
The SB ranks the world’s top 2,500 firms by R&D spending each year, but does not 
provide information to what extent the corporate structures of SB firms changes. 
Consequently, there lacks information on changes in the subsidiary structure of SB 
firms. The set of Danish SB subsidiaries appears to be rather stable over the time-
period studied and we assume that the same is true for subsidiaries of foreign SB 
firms that have employees. 6 Given the relative stability, it is assumed that by following 
the set of subsidiaries identif ied in late 2015, the report analyses a representative 
sample of SB firms and their subsidiaries in Denmark. However, this assumption loses 
reliability when expanding the period of study. This issue is amplif ied by a break in the 
database prior to 2011. The latest available registry data for this report are for 2013 
and, in order to avoid problems with data breaks and to maximize the amount of 
available data, the analyses therefore focus on changes from 2012 to 2013, unless 
otherwise stated. 
The 2,500 scoreboard f irms are multinational companies and it is difficult to assess 
their impact in a specific country. Table 4 shows an excerpt of the Danish firms in the 
scoreboard. The full scoreboard is freely accessible at the webpage of the JRC-B3-
IRITEC (http://iri.jrc.ec.europa.eu/home).  
These 25 Danish SB firms are large in terms of R&D spending, sales, and employment. 
However, these are worldwide f igures and the scoreboard reveals nothing of their 
impact on the Danish economy, or of the impact of foreign (non-Danish) scoreboard 
firms on the Danish economy. As can be observed in Table 4, most Danish SB firms 
grew in R&D spending, sales and employment from 2012 to 2013. But there is no 
guarantee that any of this expansion was actually taking place in Denmark as most of 
the Danish firms are also multinational organizations.  
The list of 25 Danish scoreboard firms reveals that most firms are active in the 
pharmaceutical industry or biotech, which is a traditional Danish stronghold. Novo 
Nordisk is the largest R&D spender with an R&D expenditure of 1,567 million euro, 
placing it in the Top 10 of the European SB firms. The list shows that Novo Nordisk 
has a higher R&D spending than the next ten R&D spenders combined. Other Danish 
stronghold companies are those that produce products related to greening of the 
economy, such as Vestas, Danfoss, Grundfos, and Rockwool International. Denmark 
also hosts two of the seven EU top 1,000 scoreboard firms in leisure goods, the toy 
company LEGO and the high-end consumer electronics firm Bang & Olufsen. 
 
 
 
 
                                        
5 It is possible to work for a firm without being assigned to a specific workplace but this is not 
common in our data. 
6 Higher levels of volatility of SB ownership are observed among subsidiaries with zero or very 
few employees. 
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Table 4 - Danish scoreboard firms. 
Name Industrial sector R&D 
R&D 
growth 
(%) 
Sales 
Sales 
growth 
(%) 
Employees 
Employee 
growth 
(%) 
ALK-Abel ló 
Pharmaceuticals & 
Biotechnology 
52.2 48.9 301 -4.3 1,763 -5 
Arla  Foods Food Producers 65.9 57.7 9,860 16.6 19,577 8.1 
Auriga  Industries Chemicals 45.3 1.2 884 5.4 2,204 2.6 
Bang & Olufsen Leisure Goods 52.3 -18 384 1.8 2,192 4.9 
Bavarian Nordic 
Pharmaceuticals & 
Biotechnology 
65.6 36 162 19.3 426 -5.3 
Chr. Hansen 
Pharmaceuticals & 
Biotechnology 
45 -3.4 738 5.7 2,510 3.5 
Coloplast 
Health Care Equipment & 
Services 
50.8 21.1 1,559 5.6 8,412 6.8 
Danfoss Industrial Engineering 185.3 4.5 4,505 -1.1 22,463 -2.7 
Danske Bank Banks 281.1 -11.3 5,663 -14.3 19,122 -5.8 
Dong Energy Gas , Water & Multi-utilities 15.9 80.3 9,672 9.5 6,692 -0.6 
DSV Industrial Transportation 24 35.6 6,124 1.8 22,021 0.4 
FLSmidth Industrial Engineering 56.1 20.7 3,607 8.3 15,317 -3.7 
GN Store Nord 
Technology Hardware & 
Equipment 
81.9 10.9 910 8.6 5,050 6.3 
Grundfos Industrial Engineering 138.4 -18.9 761 -2.5 2,790 0.5 
H. Lundbeck 
Pharmaceuticals & 
Biotechnology 
210.1 -38 2044 3.1 5,518 -0.4 
KMD 
Software & Computer 
Services 
16.8 -6.6 626 -0.6 3,199 -4.3 
Lego Leisure Goods 72.2 38.2 3,400 8.4 11,755 13 
NKT 
Electronic & Electrical 
Equipment 
41.1 1.3 2,118 3.6 8,899 0.4 
Novo Nordisk 
Pharmaceuticals & 
Biotechnology 
1,567.4 12.1 11,196 7.1 37,978 10.8 
Novozymes 
Pharmaceuticals & 
Biotechnology 
185.1 -4.4 1,574 4.6 6,162 3.6 
Rockwool 
International 
Construction & Materials 29.7 -1.8 1,997 1.6 10,066 7 
Simcorp 
Software & Computer 
Services 
48.2 10 225 7.6 1,093 1.7 
TDC 
Fixed Line 
Telecommunications 
23.4 29.6 3,296 -5.8 9,007 -3.6 
Vestas Wind Systems Alternative Energy 241 9 6,084 -15.7 15,497 -12.8 
Wi l liam Demant 
Health Care Equipment & 
Services 
84.3 2.6 1,234 7.6 9,120 13.6 
Source: EU Industrial R&D Investment Scoreboard. 
Note: 2013 data. R&D and Sales in millions of euro. Growth in percentage since 2012.  
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Unfortunately, the list provides no information about SB firms R&D spending within 
the domestic economy, while Danish SB firms generally do spend R&D domestically 
and there is evidence that some foreign SB firms have extensive R&D spending in 
Denmark. For example DuPont’s R&D spending in ingredients through Danisco, the 
spending by the large subsidiary of Microsoft with 550 employees in Copenhagen or 
the many R&D active subsidiaries of foreign SB firms active in alternative energy (e.g. 
Siemens Wind Power). But for the vast majority of foreign SB firms it is not that clear 
how much they spend on R&D in Denmark. 
The aim is to describe and analyse the impact of SB firms on the Danish economy by 
identifying the firms in Denmark that belong to a SB firm, and focus on their combined 
impact. The data builds on a list of firms by their VAT number in Denmark that belong 
to an SB firm. There are 1,195 firms in Denmark on this list, of which 250 are 
associated with the Danish SB firms in Table 4 and the remaining firms are associated 
with foreign SB firms. DST does not allow researchers to report result s based on their 
register data where it is possible to distinguish specific firms. Therefore, it is necessary 
to be particularly careful since each of the above SB firms is very significant in the 
Danish economy and would be readily recognizable from its s ize, industrial sector 
and/or region. 
Figure 6 maps the domestic SB firms’ headquarters as listed in the Central Business 
Register. 7  About half are located in the NUTS 3 regions of West-, East and South 
Jutland and North Zealand while the other half are located close to Copenhagen. 
 
Figure 6 - Location of Danish SB firms 
 
Source: The Central Business Register. 
                                        
7 www.cvr.dk. Accessed April 19, 2017. 
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The SB firms are concentrated around Copenhagen, but their subsidiaries are more 
spread out across Denmark, especially when we focus not only on the firm but go 
down one level of aggregation and focus on the geographical location of the firm’s 
individual workplaces. 
 
3.1 Merging the scoreboard firms with Statistics Denmark’s registries  
The original data on SB firms can be linked to 1,195 firms in Denmark. These firms 
are linked to 483 SB parent firms/conglomerates from the SB ranking. Of the 1,195 
subsidiary firms, 769 can be identified in the registry data. The 426 missing firms are 
suspected to be mainly holding firms without employees and potentially even without 
economic activity. As will be seen below, the 769 firms identified in the registry data 
account for a significant share of economic activity in Denmark. In addition to the 
registry data, the sample of firms is also merged to the yearly Danish Research, 
Development and Innovation (FUI) surveys. The number of firms additionally 
identif ied in the survey is 315. The information on the number of firms identified for 
use in the analyses is reported in Table 5. 
 
Table 5 - Observations 
  
SB firms/ 
Conglomerates 
Danish firms/ 
Subsidiaries 
SB firms with subsidiaries in 
Denmark 
483 1,195 
… of which can be found in 
the registry data 
445 769 
… of which are in the 
Innovation Survey (FUI) 
219 315 
Source: SB data, DST’s registry data and DST’s FUI survey  
 
The FUI surveys have a comprehensive coverage but from manual inspection of the 
merged data it nevertheless seems that several of the 25 Danish SB firms in Table 4 
are not covered by the survey. Observing the distribution of the highest R&D spenders 
in the merged data by region and industry also leads to the suspicion that more than 
half of the top 20 R&D spenders in Denmark are not SB firms, although they may be 
subsidiaries of SB firms. Furthermore, it appears that as many as 10 of the SB f irms in 
Table 4 do not appear to be among the high R&D spenders in the FUI surveys 
meaning that they must necessarily have subsidiaries with high R&D spending. These 
apparent contradictions are explained by the FUI survey focussing on single legal units 
(firms) while the SB ranking takes into account all R&D spending across the 
conglomerate. This is not a problem for our analysis since it reflects that SB firms 
have complex corporate structures where activities such as logistics or R&D are 
undertaken by what are legally separate firms, while the parent firm only has a 
handful of employees. The implication for the analyses presented in this report is that, 
even if the 25 Danish SB firms could be positively identified in the registry data, it 
would not impact the analyses if they were excluded. In other words: results are 
robust to excluding the SB firms themselves. 
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3.2 The scoreboard subsidiaries compared to other firms 
In this section, the subsidiaries of SB firms are compared to other private firms in 
Denmark. In Table 6, the comparison is based on the industry in which they are 
active. Clearly, SB firms’ subsidiaries are over-represented in manufacturing 
industries, but foreign SB firms’ subsidiaries clearly lead in wholesale ac tivities 
indicating that foreign SB firms mainly have a competence exploiting or market-
seeking motive. 
 
Table 6 - Industry distribution 
Industry 
Subsidiaries 
of foreign SB 
firms 
Domestic SB 
firms and 
their 
subsidiaries 
Other 
private 
firms in 
Denmark 
Agriculture, forestry and fishing 0.21 0 2.6 
Manufacturing, mining and quarrying and 
other industry 
32.09 57.75 16.82 
Construction 0.88 0.36 8.61 
Wholesale and retail  trade, transportation 
and storage, accommodation and food service 
activities 
49.8 5.71 34.25 
Information and communication 9.28 13.3 4.86 
Financial and insurance activities  2.04 13.9 4.95 
Real estate activities 0.35 0 1.39 
Professional, scientific, technical, 
administration and support service activities  
5.16 8.65 11.92 
Public administration, defence, education, 
human health and social work activities  
0.13 0.26 12.13 
Other services 0.07 0 2.39 
Unknown activity 0 0 0.08 
 Total 100 100 100 
Source: DST’s registries. 
Note: Percentage of FTE employment in each industry in 2013 
 
Table 7 compares the number of firms to the number of workplaces in each column 
and illustrates that the average foreign SB subsidiary has slightly less than three 
workplaces, while the average domestic SB subsidiary has about eight workplaces and 
the average in the remaining private sector is close to one workplace per firm. Table 7 
also demonstrates that SB subsidiaries have larger workplaces measured by 
employment size, i.e.  foreign SB subsidiaries have on average 47 full time equivalent 
(FTE) while this number is 106 for domestic SB subsidiaries. SB workplaces are 
considerably larger compared to other private sector workplaces that have on average 
8 FTEs. The total employment of SB subsidiaries in Denmark is about 80,000 FTE for 
both foreign and domestic firms meaning that they make up roughly 12 percent of 
private sector employment in total. 
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Table 7 - Size 
    
Subsidiaries of 
foreign SB firms 
Domestic SB firms 
and their subsidiaries  
Other private firms in 
Denmark 
Firms 
 
673 96 128,957 
Workplaces 
 
1723 783 149,805 
FTE 
Employees 
per 
workplace 
Mean 47.2 106.2 7.9 
Median 13.3 13.5 2.4 
Sum 81,310 83,148 1,181,305 
Source: DST’s registries. 
 
Table 8 shows the innovation activities of subsidiaries of SB firms compared to non-SB 
firms in Denmark where innovation is defined as the introduction of a new product or 
service. Using this measure, SB subsidiaries are more innovative than other f irms, but 
domestic subsidiaries are more innovative than foreign subsidiaries. A potential reason 
might be the overrepresentation of wholesale activities among foreign subsidiaries 
(see Table 6). 24% of other private firms (non-SB firms) are innovative while 39% 
and 61% of foreign and domestic subsidiary firms are innovative respectively. When 
instead studying differences in other forms of innovation the differences between the 
three groups are smaller but the ranking is the same: Domestic SB firms and their 
subsidiaries are the most innovative while non-SB firms are the least innovative. The 
reason why the difference is strongest when looking at product innovation is related to 
the type of activities that the various firms undertake in Denmark, and in as much as 
innovation is a linear process resulting primarily in new products, the differences are 
consistent with the observed differences in R&D spending. 
By aggregating the R&D expenditures of the subsidiaries and comparing the result to 
the total international R&D expenditures of the SB firm as reported in the SB data, it is 
possible to calculate the share of total R&D located in Denmark. The R&D expenditures 
by foreign SB subsidiaries amounts to 0.5% of the total international SB firm R&D 
expenditures for foreign SB firms, while the corresponding value for domestic SB 
subsidiaries is 66%. This highlights that domestic subsidiaries include parent firms and 
that MNEs often have most of their R&D expenditures in their home country. However,  
it must be kept in mind that foreign subsidiaries still spend much more than other 
private sector firms on R&D in Denmark. 
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Table 8 – R&D and Innovation activities 
  
Subsidiaries of 
foreign SB firms 
Domestic SB firms 
and their subsidiaries 
Other private firms in 
Denmark 
New product and/or service 38.82% 61.29% 24.49% 
New process 30.20% 50.00% 25.14% 
New Market 41.18% 54.84% 31.09% 
New organisation 45.88% 64.52% 35.50% 
R&D expenditures 
Mean 2.30 35.98 0.39 
P25 0 0 0 
Median 0 2.25 0 
  P75 0.54 28.97 0 
  Sum 586.53 2230.60 1736.76 
  per FTE 7.96 27.91 3.29 
  per Sales 5.82 9.33 0.13 
Av. Share of SB firm total international 
R&D expenditure 
0.53% 65.74% - 
Source: SB data, DST’s FUI survey and DST’s registries. 
Note: R&D expenditures in millions of euro in 2013. ‘per FTE’ is millions per FTE and ‘per Sales’ is euros of 
R&D expenditures per millions of euros in sales. 
 
The differences between the foreign SB subsidiaries and domestic SB firms and their 
subsidiaries cannot be attributed to the latter group including the 25 Danish SB firms 
themselves, as a large share of the SB firms appear very small in the registry data 
and are not covered by the FUI survey, cf. earlier. Instead, it indicates a corporate 
structure among SB firms where activities in the home country are separated into a 
number of distinct and legally independent firms, e.g. a large domestic SB firms may 
have a separate R&D subsidiary and not just a R&D department. 
Table 9 presents the distribution of the different occupation and education levels. 
Based on the distribution of occupation codes, it can be observed that domestic 
subsidiaries employ a larger share of professionals and associated professionals, while 
foreign SB subsidiaries recruit a relative high share of clerical support workers. The 
differences in innovation activities (see Table 8) and the differences in the distribution 
of occupations in Table 9 might reflect the difference in economic activities between 
domestic and foreign SB subsidiaries; in particular, it may ref lect the fact that a 
relatively large share of foreign SB subsidiaries is represented by wholesalers. SB 
subsidiaries tend to hire more highly educated workers on average, but domestic SB 
subsidiaries clearly hire even more educated workers than foreign SB subsidiaries. 
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Table 9 - Occupation and education 
 
Subsidiaries of 
foreign SB firms 
Domestic SB 
firms and their 
subsidiaries 
Other private 
firms in 
Denmark Occupation 
Managers 7.43 5.6 5.4 
Professionals 20.9 36.9 18.7 
Technicians and Associate Professionals  19.3 21.6 12.5 
Clerical Support Workers  23.2 10.4 8.9 
Services and Sales Workers  6.7 1.6 18.9 
Skil led Agricultural, Forestry and Fishery 
Workers 
0.1 0.1 1.4 
Craft and Related Trades Workers  7.8 9.0 13.4 
Plant and Machine Operators and Assemblers  10.3 11.0 7.5 
Elementary Occupations 4.3 3.8 13.4 
Education 
   
Primary education 18.0 11.6 25.4 
Upper secondary education (General) 6.8 4.0 7.1 
Upper secondary education (Specialised) 3.7 2.5 3.4 
Post-secondary non-tertiary education 37.9 34.0 38.4 
Short-cycle tertiary education 8.6 11.4 5.9 
Professional bachelor 10.5 12.0 8.0 
Academic bachelor 2.7 3.0 2.4 
Master or equivalent 11.0 18.9 8.7 
Doctoral or equivalent 0.7 2.5 0.8 
Source: DST’s registries. 
 
4 Descriptive analyses 
The previous sections described the empirical trends in the Danish economy and the 
SB f irms and subsidiaries. This section starts the analysis. It goes deeper into the role 
of the SB f irms in the Danish economy with a relatively descriptive approach. In the 
following sections econometric techniques are applied to study the role of SB firms in 
the structural transformation of the Danish job market and their effect on the Danish 
labour market. 
 
4.1 Scoreboard firm employment 
There are at least two ways to count employment using the registries of DST. One way 
is to use the total labour services employed at a firm or workplace over a year – the 
FTE employment. This is the preferred variable when comparing size. However, this 
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variable does not distinguish between different occupational categories. In order to 
distinguish between different occupational categories, it is necessary to look at the 
employment relations between employers and employees at a specific point in time 
(here: November 1st). For employees with multiple employment relations only the 
primary employment relation is included. This means that employees are not double 
counted. 
 
Table 10 - Employment by occupational category 
Number of employees 2012 (row pct.)     
  High Middling Low 
Domestic SB 52,833 61% 15,870 18% 17,260 20% 
Foreign SB 39,968 45% 25,767 29% 21,980 25% 
Non-SB 890,554 38% 328,555 14% 1,071,981 46% 
 
      Number of employees 2013 (row pct.)     
  High Middling Low 
Domestic SB 53,626 63% 16,192 19% 15,512 18% 
Foreign SB 39,745 46% 25,791 30% 20,809 24% 
Non-SB 897,069 38% 327,900 14% 1,076,141 46% 
 
      Change from 2012 to 2013 (pp change)     
  High Middling Low 
Domestic SB 793 2pp 322 1pp -1,748 -2pp 
Foreign SB -223 1pp 24 1pp -1,171 -1pp 
Non-SB 6,515 0pp -655 0pp 4,160 0pp 
Source: DST’s registries. 
Note: Pp: Percentage points. 
 
Using this approach, 52,833 persons were in a type High employment relationship 
with a domestic SB firm or subsidiary in 2012 (cf. Table 1 for the definition of “High”). 
15,870 persons were in Middling occupations and 17,260 in Low. Both domestic SB 
firms and their subsidiaries and foreign subsidiaries employ a smaller proportion of 
type Low than non-scoreboard firms and higher proportions of the other two 
categories. Domestic SB subsidiaries employ a particularly large share of High (61%) 
while foreign SB subsidiaries employ a particularly large share of Middling. 
From 2012 to 2013, the polarizing pattern among jobs is clearly visible for non-SB 
firms. The number of employment relations classified with a Middling occupation 
decreases while High and Low increase. SB f irms, on the other hand, appear to 
contribute to a general upgrading rather than polarization. They decrease the number 
of Low jobs and increase the shares of Middling and High jobs. Domestic SB f irms also 
increase High and Middling in absolute terms. The data show that there is a net 
increase in jobs of types High and Low, but the growth of type Low jobs is relatively 
small compared to the growth in High. Therefore, type Low decreases as a share of 
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total employment. Figure 1 revealed polarization in the Danish labour market  at the 
aggregate level, but this polarization trend is eliminated when only studying private 
sector firms as seen in Table 10. This means that part of the explanation for 
polarization is the creation of type Low jobs in the public sector, which fits well with 
the popular hypothesis that increases in type Low jobs is caused by Baumol's cost 
disease (Autor 2015, Baumol 1967).8 Baumol's cost disease would typically afflict jobs 
that are relatively abundant in industries like health care and education, which are 
predominantly public sector industries. 
The net changes in the bottom panel of Table 10 mask large gross flows. Table 11 
reports the gross job creation among firms and it can be seen that 20-30% are new 
jobs across all three job categories and all three firm types. Labour turnover does 
appear to be slightly lower in SB firms than in non-SB firms. 
 
Table 11 - Labour turnover 
Number of employees in 2013 that are hired in 2013 (in pct.) 
  High Middling Low 
Domestic SB 11,072 (21%) 3,345 (21%) 3,050 (20%) 
Foreign SB 6,686 (17%) 5,929 (23%) 5,429 (26%) 
Non-SB 211,188 (24%) 83,342 (25%) 374,920 (35%) 
Source: DST’s registries. 
 
 
4.2 Scoreboard firm R&D 
Table 8 contained a detailed description of SB firms and subsidiaries’ R&D and 
innovation activities relative to non-SB firms as revealed in the FUI survey. In this 
section, additional details are added in the description of private sector R&D in 
Denmark. The FUI survey from 2013 has 4,787 observations while the relevant 
population for measuring private sector R&D activities in Denmark consist of 18,674 
firms according to DST.9 61 of the 4,787 firms in the 2013 FUI survey are domestic SB 
firms and subsidiaries while 254 firms are foreign SB subsidiaries. As already 
mentioned, manual inspection of the data suggests that at least on third of the actual 
Danish SB firms (cf. Table 4) are not covered by the FUI survey data. 
The total R&D expenditures (costs and investment, not purchase) of the firms in the 
sample amount to 4,554 million euro and after applying weights, Statistics Denmark 
infers that the population wide expenditures are 4,867 million euro. This number is 
reported by DST as the official private sector R&D in Denmark in 2013. Hence, the 
firms in the sample constitute the bulk of R&D active firms in Denmark. The specific 
weights used by DST are not available, but they obviously oversample large f irms and 
                                        
8Baumol’s Cost Disease applies to activities producing output with demand that is relatively 
income elastic but price inelastic, and where technological progress has a limited or no effect at 
all on productivity. Demand for such output (e.g. many personal services including some in 
education, health, etc.) remains more or less fixed in relative terms as income rises meaning 
that a larger share of the workforce must be engaged in supplying them. However, at the same 
time, people employed in these industries do not experience productivity growth and hence 
their wage will often not be able to grow at the same pace as the average wage. 
9 Cf. DST’s own analysis of the FUI data. 
http://www.dst.dk/ext/4364210019/0/serviceit/2013--xlsx. Accessed 4 May 2017. 
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firms in specific sectors. The survey covers 100% of firms with more than 250 
employees and more than 80% of firms in the ICT, pharmaceutical and scientific R&D 
sectors. The data are thus not representative of the Danish economy as a whole but 
they are highly representative for firms in Denmark with R&D activities. 
As shown in Table 8, 2,231 million euro of the private sector R&D expenditures can be 
attributed to domestic SB firms and their subsidiaries while 587 million euro can be 
attributed to the subsidiaries of foreign SB firms. Table 8 also documented the 
differences in R&D intensity showing that domestic SB firms and their subsidiaries 
have a particularly high R&D intensity when comparing R&D to employment, while 
non-SB firms have a particularly low R&D intensity when comparing R&D to sales. 
These differences are likely to be partially explained by differences in activities in the 
groups of firms. For SB firms and subsidiaries, however, the activity of the parent firm 
(as indicated by the industry of the firm), may differ from the activity of the subsidiary 
which actually has the R&D expenditures. Part of the R&D by SB f irms is undertaken 
by subsidiaries that are active in sectors other than the SB parent firm; this is 
illustrated in Table 12. The table shows how SB parent firms’ subsidiary R&D is 
distributed across industries. For example, 49 perc ent of the R&D undertaken by 
subsidiaries of SB firms in “Food, beverages and tobacco” is undertaken in that same 
industry, while 51% are undertaken in “Chemicals”. As should be expected, a large 
share of R&D is registered along the diagonal of the table. However, a non-trivial 
amount of R&D is also undertaken “off the diagonal”. In particular, R&D is relatively 
often undertaken in “computers, electronics and optical”, “wholesale” and “research 
and development” in cases where the SB firm itself has a different industry 
classification. Domestic SB f irms are obviously located along the diagonal while the 
wholesalers are likely to be subsidiaries of foreign SB firms. 
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Table 12 - Sectoral distribution of SB firms' R&D 
 
Industry of SB subsidiary fi rm performing R&D 
SB parent firm industry A CA CB CE CF CG CH CI CJ CK CL CM D E G H JA JB JC K MA MB N Sum 
A. Agriculture etc 
              
100 
        
100 
CA. Food, beverages and tobacco 
 
48.83 
 
51.17 
                   
100 
CB. Texti les and leather 
                     
100 
 
100 
CE. Chemicals 0.52 4.55 
 
87.76 5.67 
 
0.93 
       
0.57 
        
100 
CF. Pharmaceuticals 
   
12.54 85.56 
         
1.71 
   
0.19 
    
100 
CG. Plastics, glass and concrete 
     
1.59 1.77 
       
50.41 
     
46.23 
  
100 
CH. Metal 
 
24.84 
     
31.5 43.66 
              
100 
CI. Computers, electronics and optical 
  
7.45 
   
21.79 3.36 31.62 
    
10.90 
   
1.63 
  
23.24 
 
100 
CJ. Electrical equipment 
       
15.79 4.39 36.29 
 
3.68 
         
39.85 
 
100 
CK. Machinery 
      
1.57 0.50 0.20 91.93 
    
5.81 
        
100 
CL. Transport equipment 
       
95.23 
 
0.39 
    
4.38 
        
100 
CM. Furniture and others 
     
46.76 
 
53.22 
               
100 
D. Electricity, gas, etc 
                    
3.25 96.75 
 
100 
E. Water and waste management 
                    
100 
  
100 
G. Wholesale and retail trade 
       
100 
               
100 
H. Transportation and s torage 
                       
0 
JA. Publ ishing, radio and TV 
       
0.92 
        
5.27 
 
93.81 
    
100 
JB. Telecommunication 
       
49.78 
      
24.18 
  
26.04 
     
100 
JC. IT and Information services 
                  
100 
    
100 
K. Financial and insurance activi ties 
         
0.28 32.35 
       
67.32 0.05 
  
100 
MA. Consulting etc. 
         
27.81 
     
69.08 
      
3.11 100 
MB. Research and Development 
                       
0 
N. Admin. and support service 
                      
100 100 
Source: SB data and DST’s FUI survey. 
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4.3 Geographical distribution of employment 
As indicated in Table 3, the scoreboard firms and subsidiaries are not evenly geographical 
distributed across Denmark. Table 9 showed the geographical distribution across NUTS 3 
regions by workplace level full time equivalent employment. This analysis will, however, be 
firm level since several variables of interest - not least the contents of the FUI surveys - are 
firm level.10 
Figure 7 illustrates the location coefficients for the SB firms and subsidiaries at the workplace 
level while Figure 8 illustrates the location when data are aggregated to the firm level. The 
location coefficient is defined as the region’s share of SB employment relative to its share of 
total employment: 
 𝐿𝐶𝑖 =
𝑁𝑖
𝑆𝐵 /𝑁𝑆𝐵
𝑁𝑖/𝑁
 (1) 
𝑁𝑖 is employment in region 𝑖 and 𝑁 is national employment. 𝑆𝐵 indicates that the variable only 
pertains to SB firms and subsidiaries. The coefficient takes a value higher than 1 if a region is 
relatively specialised in SB employment in the sense that SB employment constitutes a 
disproportionately large share of regional employment. NUTS 3 regions specialised in SB 
employment (𝐿𝐶𝑖 > 1.25) are coloured green while regions specialised in non-SB employment 
(𝐿𝐶𝑖 < 0.75) are red. Intermediate regions are coloured yellow. Table 13 explains the colouring 
of the maps. 
 
Figure 7 – Employment at the workplace level 
 
Source: DST’s registries. 
Note: See Table 13 for legend. 
 
                                        
10 The analysis is based on aggregating individual employment relations to the firm level in order to 
distinguish between different occupations, which entails that no correction is made for the extent of 
working hours in each employment relationship 
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There is no obvious link between a region’s specialisation in SB employment and a region’s 
socio-economic classification (cf. Figure 2). Regions that are relatively peripheral as well as 
regions that are relatively urban can exhibit relative specialisation in SB employment.  
 
Figure 8 - Employment at the firm level 
 
Source: DST’s registries. 
Note: See Table 13 for legend. No data in NUTS 3 region DK014 Bornholm 
 
Table 13 - Map colours 
Value range 0.00-0.75 0.75-1.25 1.25- 
Colour Red Yellow Green 
Interpretation 
of figures 7, 8 
and 10 
Relatively 
specialised in 
non-SB 
Not 
Specialised 
Relatively 
specialised in 
SB 
Interpretation 
of figures 9 
and 11 
Foreign SB 
over 
represented 
Relative 
balance 
Domestic SB 
over 
represented 
 
There are two regions specialised in SB employment (green in Figure 7), i.e. West Jutland and 
the large Copenhagen area. The figure illustrates relative specialisation and the fact that these 
two regions are green does not necessarily entail that most SB employees work in these 
regions, only that the number is disproportionately large relative to the region’s size. If 
employment is aggregated to the firm level rather than the workplace level the result is Figure 
8. There are again two green regions but this time they are Copenhagen surroundings and 
Copenhagen. This reflects that the firms’ addresses tend to be in Copenhagen even though 
they have workplaces scattered over the country. Studying firm level data may entail a 
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geographical distortion as all employment, sales, R&D etc. are registered at the firms’ central 
addresses. The one variable where it is possible to gauge the extent of this distortion is 
employment, as it can be measured at the workplace level. Conclusions reached by comparing 
Figures 7 and 8 are potentially sensitive to the detail of the figures and the cut-off value 
deciding whether a region is given one or the other colour. However, the conclusion that firm 
level data attributes a disproportionate share of economic activity to Copenhagen is robust.  
Figures 7 and 8 show the general relative specialisation in SB employment, while Figure 9 
illustrates the balance between foreign subsidiaries and domestic SB firms and their 
subsidiaries using workplace level employment. The figure is coloured according to the ratio of 
the location coefficients for the two groups (denoted F and D respectively).  
 𝐵𝑖 =
𝐿𝐶𝑖
𝐷
𝐿𝐶𝑖
𝐹 =
𝑁𝑖
𝐷.𝑆𝐵/𝑁𝐷.𝑆𝐵
𝑁𝑖
𝐹.𝑆𝐵/𝑁𝐹.𝑆𝐵
 (2) 
A balance of 1 (𝐵𝑖 = 1) means that the region is equally specialised in foreign and domestic SB 
employment while a value greater than 1 means that the regions is relatively specialised in 
domestic SB firms and their subsidiaries, and a value less than 1 means that the region is 
relatively specialised in foreign SB subsidiaries. 
Figure 9 shows that the regions specialised in SB employment (West Jutland and Copenhagen 
surroundings, cf. Figure 7) are particularly specialised in domestic SB employment, and so is 
North Zealand. Five regions are relatively specialised in foreign SB employment. These include 
regions that were shown earlier to host none of the domestic SB firms themselves, but in 
Copenhagen there is also much more foreign than domestic SB employment.  
 
Figure 9 - Balance for workplace level employment 
 
Source: DST’s registries.  
Note: See Table 13 for legend. 
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4.4 Geographical distribution of R&D 
Figure 10 shows the relative geographical distribution of SB firms’ R&D expenditures. The 
figure shows the relative R&D coefficient defined analogously to the location coefficient in 
equations 1: the region’s share of SB R&D relative to its share of total private sector R&D. The 
colours of the regions adhere to Table 13. R&D expenditures are measured at the firm level 
and thus Figure 10 can be compared to the geographical distribution of firm level employment 
in Figure 8. Thus it is interesting to note that West Jutland is specialised in SB R&D though not 
in firm level employment. Figure 7 showed that West Jutland is specialised in workplace level 
employment but R&D expenditures are not measured at the workplace level and hence these 
two maps are not directly comparable. The two regions Copenhagen and Copenhagen 
surroundings are not specialised in R&D though they were specialised in terms of employment, 
indicating that R&D intensity is relatively low in these two regions. 
 
Figure 10 - Domestic SB firm and their subsidiaries' R&D 
 
Source: DST’s FUI survey and DST’s registries.  
Note: See Table 13 for legend. No data in NUTS 3 region DK014 Bornholm 
 
Figure 11 shows the balance for R&D expenditures defined analogously to equation 2. 
Interestingly, there are no yellow regions: regions are either relatively specialised in foreign SB 
R&D (red) or in domestic SB R&D (green). The green regions are, not surprisingly, the regions 
where domestic SB parent firms are located (cf. Figure 6). 
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Figure 11 - Foreign SB subsidiaries' R&D 
 
Source: DST’s FUI survey and DST’s registries.  
Note: See Table 13 for legend. No data in NUTS 3 region DK014 Bornholm 
 
Domestic SB f irm R&D is relatively concentrated in and around Copenhagen, and in the 
industrial heartland of South/Central Jutland. This is no surprise given the location of the firms 
that appear on the scoreboard, c.f. earlier but it can also be expected that the concentration in 
Copenhagen is over-emphasised from nationwide R&D being registered at the firm’s main 
municipality and not at the workplaces spread out across the country. There are relatively high 
shares of foreign SB R&D undertaken on Zealand outside Copenhagen and in North/West 
Jutland. It is striking that Funen with the university city of Odense has relatively little 
scoreboard R&D. It indicates an environment of many smaller firms doing R&D with only a 
limited role for large multinational firms.  
 
5 Regression analysis 
The previous section described the role of SB firms and subsidiaries in Denmark and it is 
abundantly clear that they have a huge impact on employment and on R&D in the Danish 
economy. In this section we go into more detail regarding the two more specific questions 
raised earlier: how do SB firms and subsidiaries contribute to the structural transformation of 
the Danish economy as evident from labour market data, and how they affect the labour 
market in terms of wage growth and mobility? 
In principle, the factors leading to job polarization are at three distinct levels where the focus 
of this report is exclusively on the first: 
1. Within firms. Changes in technology or organisation leads to change in the types of 
labour employed. 
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2. Between firms, but within industries. Competition leads some firms to grow relative to 
others, and the occupational composition of successful firms thus become more 
dominant in the economy 
3. Between industries. The structural transformation of the economy entails that some 
industries expand while others contract. In other words, some economic activities and 
the associated technologies and skills become relatively less important in the economy 
while others become relatively more important. 
Goos et al. (2014) focus on the distinction within vs. between industries and conclude that 
both elements are important, but they are not able to split the within industry effect into 
between and within firm components. Heyman (2016) performs two separate decompositions 
into within and between effects at the firm and industry level respectively and concludes that 
there are important within and between effects at both levels, though Heyman does not 
perform a decomposition that takes both levels into account simultaneously and the details of 
the applied method are not elaborated. However the studies agree that the within firm effects 
are an important part of the explanation which warrants the approach in this report. 
As in earlier studies of job polarization and skill biased technological change based on micro 
level data, this report will use Seemingly Unrelated Regression models, SUR models (Sanders 
and ter Weel, 2000; Caroli and Van Reenen, 2001; Piva et al., 2005). The basic SUR model is a 
system of 𝐾 equations for the wage cost shares of 𝐾 types of labour. The rationale for using a 
SUR model relies on specifying a transcendental logarithmic (translog) functional form for a 
model of firms’ costs. This entails the assumption that the output level is given for firms, and 
that firms must minimize costs for this output level. The translog model and the SUR method 
are elaborated in the appendix. For discussions of empirical applications of the translog 
functional form and SUR models see Greene (2000), and Christensen and Greene (1976) in 
addition to the above references. 
 
5.1 Results for the sources of job polarization 
Equation 14 from the appendix is the general version of the model to be estimated and it is 
repeated here as equation 3. To reiterate: The dependent variable, Δ𝑠𝑘, is the change in the 
wage cost share of category 𝑘 employees at the firm. Employment share is used rather than 
wage cost share to avoid endogeneity issues with the wage regressors, and as the primary 
interest is in the shifts in the frequency of labour categories. 
The regressors are  Δ ln (
𝑤𝑖
𝑤𝑗
): the change in the log of wage for each labour category where 
category 𝑗  is used as a numeraire, Δ ln 𝑌 : the change in the log of output, and Δ ln 𝐴𝑛 : the 
change in the log of each element in the vector of technology variables. 
 Δ𝑠𝑘 = ∑ 𝛼𝑘𝑖 Δ ln (
𝑤𝑖
𝑤𝑗
)𝑖≠𝑗 + 𝛼𝑘𝑌 Δ ln 𝑌 + ∑ 𝛽𝑘𝑛 Δ ln 𝐴𝑛𝑛 + Δ𝑢𝑘 (3) 
There are three equations to estimate: 𝑘 =  (𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ , 𝑀𝑖𝑑𝑑𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑔 (𝑀𝑖𝑑 ), 𝐿𝑜𝑤) but as explained in the 
appendix the system of three equations is singular and only two of the equations are estimated 
in practice while the parameter estimates of the third equation are computed from the first two 
equations. The system of two equations to estimate is: 
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Δ𝑠𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ ,𝑖 = 𝛽0𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ + 𝛼𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ Δ ln (
𝑤𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ
𝑤𝐿𝑜𝑤
)
𝑖
+ 𝛼𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑀𝑖𝑑 Δ ln (
𝑤𝑀𝑖𝑑
𝑤𝐿𝑜𝑤
)
𝑖
+ 𝛼𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑌 Δ ln 𝑌𝑖 + 𝛽𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡 Δ ln 𝑋𝑖
+ 𝛽𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡Δ ln 𝐼𝑀𝑖 + 𝛽𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑅&𝐷 Δ ln 𝑅&𝐷𝑖 + 𝛽𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑑 𝑃𝐷𝑖 + 𝛽𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑐 𝑃𝐶𝑖 + 𝛽𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑀𝐾𝑖
+ 𝛽𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑂𝑟𝑔𝐸𝑥𝑡 𝑂𝐸𝑖 + 𝛽𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑂𝑟𝑔𝐹𝑜𝑟 𝑂𝐹𝑖 + 𝛽𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑂𝑟𝑔𝑊𝑟𝑘 𝑂𝑊𝑖 + 𝛾𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑁𝑂𝑆𝐵 𝑁𝑂𝑆𝐵𝑖 + 𝛾𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ𝐹𝑅𝑆𝐵 𝐹𝑅𝑆𝐵𝑖
+ 𝛾𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑙𝑛𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖 + 𝛾𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑀𝑎𝑛𝑢𝑓 𝑀𝑎𝑛𝑢 𝑓𝑖 + 𝜖𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ ,𝑖 
  (4) 
Δ𝑠𝑀𝑖𝑑 ,𝑖 = 𝛽0𝑀𝑖𝑑 + 𝛼𝑀𝑖𝑑𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ Δ ln (
𝑤𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ
𝑤𝐿𝑜𝑤
)
𝑖
+ 𝛼𝑀𝑖𝑑𝑀𝑖𝑑 Δ ln (
𝑤𝑀𝑖𝑑
𝑤𝐿𝑜𝑤
)
𝑖
+ 𝛼𝑀𝑖𝑑𝑌 Δ ln 𝑌𝑖 + 𝛽𝑀𝑖𝑑𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡Δ ln 𝑋𝑖
+ 𝛽𝑀𝑖𝑑𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡 Δ ln 𝐼𝑀𝑖 + 𝛽𝑀𝑖𝑑𝑅&𝐷 Δ ln 𝑅&𝐷𝑖 + 𝛽𝑀𝑖𝑑𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑑 𝑃𝐷𝑖 + 𝛽𝑀𝑖𝑑𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑐 𝑃𝐶𝑖 + 𝛽𝑀𝑖𝑑𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑀𝐾𝑖
+ 𝛽𝑀𝑖𝑑𝑂𝑟𝑔𝐸𝑥𝑡 𝑂𝐸𝑖 + 𝛽𝑀𝑖𝑑𝑂𝑟𝑔𝐹𝑜𝑟 𝑂𝐹𝑖 + 𝛽𝑀𝑖𝑑𝑂𝑟𝑔𝑊𝑟𝑘 𝑂𝑊𝑖 + 𝛾𝑀𝑖𝑑𝑁𝑂𝑆𝐵 𝑁𝑂𝑆𝐵𝑖 + 𝛾𝑀𝑖𝑑𝐹𝑅𝑆𝐵 𝐹𝑅𝑆𝐵𝑖
+ 𝛾𝑀𝑖𝑑𝑆 𝑖𝑧𝑒 𝑙𝑛𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖 + 𝛾𝑀𝑖𝑑𝑀𝑎𝑛𝑢𝑓 𝑀𝑎𝑛𝑢 𝑓𝑖 + 𝜖𝑀𝑖𝑑 ,𝑖 
The dependent variable is the change in employment share at firm 𝑖 from 2012 to 2013 of the 
relevant occupational type while all explanatory variables are measured prior to these two 
years. They are either changes from 2011 to 2012, survey questions pertaining to changes 
2010-2012 or time invariant dummies. 
There are two variables for relative wage: Δ ln (
𝑤𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ
𝑤𝐿𝑜𝑤
)
𝑖
 and Δ ln (
𝑤𝑀𝑖𝑑
𝑤𝐿𝑜𝑤
)
𝑖
. The wage for an 
occupational group is computed as the average wage income over the year for individuals of 
the particular occupational group living in the municipality where the firm is based. If a firm 
consists of only one workplace and this workplace’s address is in the municipality “Aalborg” 
then 𝑤𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ  is the average wage income for persons with an occupation in the High group and 
living in Aalborg. This is intended to reflect the costs of expanding the workforce with this 
occupation. We do not use the average wage income for employees within the occupation at 
the firm since several firms have few or even no employees of a particular group even after 
removing small firms. Our measure of wages furthermore entails that we avoid a common 
endogeneity problem arising from firm level wages and labour composition being jointly 
determined. For firms consisting of several workplaces in different municipalities the wage 
variables are computed as the average over the relevant municipalities weighted by the size of 
the firm’s workplaces. 
The estimate for 𝛼𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑀𝑖𝑑  can be used to derive the elasticity of substitution between the labour 
types High and Middling, and the estimate for 𝛼𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ  can be used to derive and own price 
elasticity for type High. Similar method can be used for the other equations. In short, if 𝛼𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑀𝑖𝑑  
is zero then the elasticity of substitution is 1 and labour of types High and Mid are substitutes. 
If the estimate is negative then they are complements. 
Output is measured as sales deflated to 2015 values using the consumer price index. Other 
relevant variables are also deflated in this manner.  Δ ln 𝑌𝑖 is the change in log sales from 2011 
to 2012 and its estimated effect indicates the homogeneity of the cost function. If 𝛼𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑌 =
𝛼𝑀𝑖𝑑𝑌 = 𝛼𝐿𝑜𝑤𝑌 = 0 then the cost function is homogenous of degree 1 meaning that a proportional 
increase in all inputs (types of labour) is associated with a proportional increase in output.  
The 𝛽𝑠 all indicate whether the various technology indicators are complements or substitutes to 
the types of jobs. If an estimate for a 𝛽 is positive then there is indication of complementarity. 
If the estimate for 𝛽𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑅𝐷  is positive, for example, it means that R&D expenditures are 
complementary to type High employment. If the estimate is negative then they are 
substitutes. The first three technology variables are Δ ln 𝑋𝑖 , Δ ln 𝐼𝑀𝑖  and Δ ln 𝑅&𝐷𝑖 , and are the 
change 2011-2012 in log exports, imports and R&D expenditures for firm 𝑖 respectively. The 
following six variables are binary variables for innovation. 𝑃𝐷𝑖  is 1 if the firm introduced a new 
product or service in 2010-2012 while 𝑃𝐶𝑖 and 𝑀𝐾𝑖  indicate process and marketing innovation 
respectively. Since change in occupational c omposition is likely to be closely linked to 
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organisational innovation it is exploited that the FUI survey allows us to distinguish between 
three different forms of organisational innovation. 𝑂𝐸𝑖 , 𝑂𝐹𝑖  and 𝑂𝑊𝑖  are 1 if the firm has 
undertaken organisational innovation in terms of external linkages, formal structure and work 
organisation respectively. 
Finally, controls for SB f irms, firms’ size and sector are included. 𝑁𝑂𝑆𝐵𝑖 and 𝐹𝑅𝑆𝐵𝑖 are 1 if the 
firm is not a SB firm or a foreign SB subsidiary respectively. I.e. the reference is domestic SB 
firms and subsidiaries. It would arguably be more coherent to have non-SB as the reference, 
but in later regressions only SB f irms and subsidiaries are used and hence domestic SB is used 
as the reference for comparability. 𝑙𝑛𝑆𝑖𝑧 𝑒𝑖 is the log of employment at the firm in 2012 and 
𝑀𝑎𝑛𝑢 𝑓𝑖  is 1 if the firm is in the manufacturing sector. The epsilons are classical errors with the 
exception that they correlate across equations. 
 
Table 14 – Variables in SUR model 
Variable Definition (change in period 2011-2012. Dependent variables: 2012-2013) 
Δ𝑠𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ,𝑖, Δ𝑠𝑀𝑖𝑑,𝑖 , Δ𝑠𝐿𝑜𝑤,𝑖 Change in the share of type High, Mid and Low respectively in firm i's workforce 
Δ ln (
𝑤𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ
𝑤𝐿𝑜𝑤
)
𝑖
, Δ ln (
𝑤𝑀𝑖𝑑
𝑤𝐿𝑜𝑤
)
𝑖
  Change in log of average wage for type High (Mid) workers relative to the average wage 
for type Low workers in firm i's home municipality 
Δ ln 𝑌𝑖 Change in log of firm sales  
Δ ln 𝑋𝑖  Change in log of firm exports  
Δ ln 𝐼𝑀𝑖  Change in log of firm imports  
Δ ln 𝑅&𝐷𝑖  Change in log of firm total R&D expenditures (costs and investment) 
𝑃𝐷𝑖  1 if firm 𝑖 introduced new or significantly changed product or service 2010-2012 
𝑃𝐶𝑖 
1 if firm 𝑖  introduced new or significantly changed method for production, logistics or 
support functions 2010-2012 
𝑀𝐾𝑖  
1 if firm 𝑖  introduced new or significantly changed design, promotion techniques, 
marketing strategy, sales channels or pricing 2010-2012 
𝑂𝐸𝑖  
1 if firm 𝑖  introduced new methods for organising external l inkages (alliances, 
partnerships, suppliers etc.) 2010-2012 
𝑂𝐹𝑖  
1 if firm 𝑖  introduced new methods for organising formal structure (quality control, 
knowledge management, supply chain management etc.) 2010-2012 
𝑂𝑊𝑖  
1 if firm 𝑖  introduced new methods for organising work (decentralisation teams, job 
rotation etc.) 2010-2012 
𝑁𝑂𝑆𝐵𝑖 1 if firm 𝑖 is not a subsidiary of a SB firm 
𝐹𝑅𝑆𝐵𝑖 1 if firm 𝑖 is a subsidiary of a foreign SB firm 
Δ ln 𝑝. 𝑅&𝐷𝑖 Change in log of parent firm R&D expenditures  
Δ ln 𝑝.𝑌𝑖 Change in log of parent firm sales  
𝑙𝑛𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖 Log of firm employment in 2012 
𝑀𝑎𝑛𝑢𝑓𝑖  Dummy for manufacturing firms 
 
Later models are restricted to only the SB firms and this allows the use of two additional 
indicators: the change 2011-2012 in log sales and in log R&D for the SB parent company which 
will be added to the equations as 𝛽𝑘𝑝 .𝑅&𝐷 Δ ln 𝑝. 𝑅&𝐷𝑖  and  𝛽𝑘𝑝 .𝑌 Δln 𝑝. 𝑌𝑖 . I.e. parent sales are 
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considered as part of the vector of technology related variables. In later models, interaction 
terms between the variables in the technology vector and the dummies for SB firms will be 
added. These will take the form of, for example 𝛽𝑘𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑑𝐹𝑅𝑆𝐵 𝑃𝐷𝑖 𝐹𝑅𝑆𝐵𝑖 .The variables are 
summarised in Table 14. 
 
5.2 Descriptive statistics 
Before reporting the regression analyses, the data will be described in more detail. Since the 
variables in the regression model only can be identified for firms that are present in 2011-
2013, new firms and firms that close down are excluded. Removing these firms and firms 
where data on output or the regional wage level is missing yields 19,459 observations which 
can be used in a relatively simple regression where the technology related variables (i.e. the 
variables with a beta parameter) are omitted. It was noted in connection with Table 10 that 
removing the public sector from the analysis made the polarization tendency disappear. 
Instead, the sample reveals general upgrading, where type Low declines while type High and 
to some degree type Mid increases. General upgrading rather than polarization was also the 
pattern observed for Denmark by Fernández-Macías (2012). This study of the effect of R&D 
and innovation on the shifts in the labour market is dependent on FUI surveys, this further 
decreases the sample to 2,713 f irms. In this smaller sample, the trend for general upgrading is 
even stronger. Finally, the SB firms and subsidiaries are studied in isolation. There are only 
228 firms in this sample since the SB firms and subsidiaries must also be on the FUI surveys. 
In this f inal sample the tendency towards upgrading is particularly strong with a 1.78 
percentage point decrease in Low, and increases of 1.43 and 0.34 percentage points for High 
and Mid respectively. Table 15 reports the weighted mean of the three dependent variables for 
the three samples. 
 
Table 15 - Weighted mean of dependent variables 
 Sample  Δ𝑠𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ,𝑖  Δ𝑠𝑀𝑖𝑑 ,𝑖,  Δ𝑠𝐿𝑜𝑤,𝑖, Sample size 
Implied by Table 10 0.0016 -0.0006 -0.0010 
 All  excluding entry and exit 0.0049 0.0019 -0.0068 19459 
FUI survey 0.0069 0.0012 -0.0081 2713 
SB only 0.0143 0.0034 -0.0178 228 
Source: Own computations from DST’s registries 
 
Figures 16 and 17 further describe the joint distribution of the dependent variables. Figure 16 
plots the  Δ𝑠𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ,𝑖 against  Δ𝑠𝑀𝑖𝑑,𝑖  while figure 17 plots Δ𝑠𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ,𝑖 against  Δ𝑠𝐿𝑜𝑤,𝑖. The plots show the 
2,713 observations from the FUI survey with SB f irms and subsidiaries indicated in yellow. The 
plots also contain normal density curves for the distributions. There is a large degree of 
variation around the means with some firms showing positive or negative percentage point 
changes near 100%. However, most observations cluster near the centre; a tendency, which is 
perhaps slightly more pronounced for SB firms and subsidiaries than for other firms, but this 
may be explained by the larger size of these firms. 
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Table 16 - Distribution of dependent variable: High vs Middling 
 
Source: Own computations from DST’s registries  
Note: Yellow: SB firms and subsidiaries. Blue: Non-SB firms. 
 
Table 17 - Distribution of dependent variable: High vs Low 
 
Source: Own computations from DST’s registries  
Note: Yellow: SB firms and subsidiaries. Blue: Non-SB firms. 
 
The plots show that there is a strong negative correlation between the dependent variables, 
which is necessary since a percentage point change in one type of jobs must be accompanied 
by an exact opposite change for the other types. 
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Table 18 contains summary statistics for the independent variables and reports their 
correlation with the dependent variables. The correlations among the dependent variables 
correspond to Figures 16 and 17 and their mean values are the same as in Table 17. 
Some of the descriptive statistics are unexpected. Both variables for relative real wage change 
have negative means, which implies that low wage groups have had the highest wage increase 
in the period. However, given the variables’ definition the negative means could also mean 
that SB firms and subsidiaries have grown relatively most in low wage regions. The table also 
shows that the average firm did quite well in 2011-2012 with a 7 percent increase in sales, a 
10 percent increase in exports, a 16 percent increase in imports and a 5 percent increase in 
R&D. Again, it must be emphasised that the sample is based on the FUI surveys and are hence 
representative of firms active in private sector R&D rather than the entire economy.  
 
Table 18 - Descriptive statistics, weighted 
        Correlations   
Variable Mean Std Dev Δ𝑠𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ,𝑖 Δ𝑠𝑀𝑖𝑑 ,𝑖 Δ𝑠𝐿𝑜𝑤,𝑖 
Δ𝑠𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ,𝑖 0.0069 0.7506 1.000 -0.2057*** -0.6556*** 
Δ𝑠𝑀𝑖𝑑 ,𝑖 0.0012 0.7110 -0.2057*** 1.000 -0.6040*** 
Δ𝑠𝐿𝑜𝑤,𝑖 -0.0081 0.9217 -0.6556*** -0.6040*** 1.000 
Δ ln (
𝑤𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ
𝑤𝐿𝑜𝑤
)
𝑖
 -0.0113 0.1602 0.0340* 0.01785 -0.0414** 
Δ ln (
𝑤𝑀𝑖𝑑
𝑤𝐿𝑜𝑤
)
𝑖
 -0.0043 0.2045 0.0117 0.0561*** -0.0528*** 
Δ ln 𝑌𝑖 0.0727 13.8916 0.0094 0.0279 -0.0292 
Δ ln 𝑋𝑖  0.0957 40.5864 0.0020 0.0222 -0.0187 
Δ ln 𝐼𝑀𝑖  0.1559 37.0101 0.00742 0.0383** -0.0356* 
Δ ln 𝑅&𝐷𝑖  0.0460 10.9939 -0.0101 0.0407** -0.0231 
𝑃𝐷𝑖  0.5057  -0.0119 -0.0227 0.027 
𝑃𝐶𝑖 0.5314  0.0083 0.0179 -0.0205 
𝑀𝐾𝑖  0.4813  -0.0354* -0.0458** 0.0642*** 
𝑂𝐸𝑖  0.3135  0.0262 0.0254 -0.0409** 
𝑂𝐹𝑖  0.5519  0.0333* -0.0243 -0.0084 
𝑂𝑊𝑖  0.4686  0.0339* 0.0214 -0.0441** 
𝑁𝑂𝑆𝐵𝑖 0.7626  -0.0777*** -0.0272 0.0831*** 
𝐹𝑅𝑆𝐵𝑖 0.1225  -0.0211 0.0581*** -0.0277 
Δ ln 𝑝. 𝑅&𝐷𝑖 0.0209 10.8691 -0.0263 0.0000 0.0232 
Δ ln 𝑝. 𝑌𝑖 0.0648 2.5719 0.2832*** -0.1021 -0.1713*** 
Source: Own computations from DST’s registries. 
Note: SUR estimates. Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
Table 18 also shows that about 50 percent of firms report the different types of innovation, 
except for organisational innovation concerning external linkages where the percentage is 31.  
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The positive and significant correlation between imports and change in share of Mid, and 
between R&D and the change in share of Mid is unexpected as technology and offshoring are 
expected to eliminate this type of jobs. However, the regression should clarify the relationships 
between these variables. The correlations between the dummies for non-SB subsidiaries and 
for subsidiaries of foreign SB firms suggest that foreign and domestic SB subsidiaries play 
different roles in the general upgrading of jobs in Denmark, with domestic firms increasing the 
share of High and foreign subsidiary firms increasing the share of Mid. 
 
5.3 Estimation 
Estimation of the equation system in equation 4 is undertaken with the iterated Zellner 
estimator. This means that the error covariance matrix is initially produced from OLS estimates 
before the equation parameters are estimated, and these estimates are then used to update 
the error covariance matrix. The process continues until convergence and is equivalent to 
maximum likelihood estimation in our case (Berndt, 1990, p. 463). Since we are analysing 
aggregate job polarization we will use firm size defined as average full time equivalent 
employment in 2012 and 2013 as weight, and we will disregard firms with 10 or fewer 
employees on average since such small organisations do not meaningfully have organisational 
structure or sufficient division of labour to have clear occupational groups. The threshold size 
of 10 employees is the common threshold between micro enterprises and small- and medium-
sized enterprises used by organisations such as Eurostat. The number of observations left after 
this censoring was reported in the Table 15 for the various samples. After estimating the 
system in equation 4 we will compute the estimates for the equation for type Low. For 
example:  
 𝛼𝐿𝑜𝑤𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ̂ = −𝛼𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ̂ − 𝛼𝑀𝑖𝑑𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ̂  (5) 
The variance (and hence standard error) for the estimate computed in equation 5 can be 
manually computed from the variance-covariance matrix of the estimates arising from 
estimating equation 4 as (continuing the example): 
 𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝛼𝐿𝑜𝑤𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ̂ ) = 𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝛼𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ̂ ) + 𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝛼𝑀𝑖𝑑𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ̂ ) + 2𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝛼𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ̂ , 𝛼𝑀𝑖𝑑𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ̂ ) (6) 
A coefficient of determination for the Low equation can also be computed from the inferred 
parameters. See Berndt (1990) pp. 469-476 for more details. 
 
5.4 Results 
Table 19 shows the result from estimating equation 4 without the variables for technology (i.e. 
variables with a beta parameter). This allows us to include most private sector firms in 
Denmark above the size threshold for inclusion in our data. Table 20 shows the results from 
estimating equation 4 as presented above. Table 20 is thus restricted to the firms that are on 
the FUI survey. Table 21 shows the result from estimating the model for only the SB firms and 
subsidiaries. Thus parent R&D and sales are only included in Table 21.  
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Table 19 - Estimates without technology 
Parameter High Mid Low 
𝛼𝑘𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ  0.0839** 0.0061 -0.0900** 
 
(0.0364) (0.0261) (0.0366) 
𝛼𝑘𝑀𝑖𝑑  0.0061 0.0876** -0.0937*** 
 
(0.0261) (0.0354) (0.0359) 
𝛼𝑘𝑌  0.0002 0.0010* -0.0013* 
  (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0006) 
𝛾𝑘𝑁𝑂𝑆𝐵  -0.0178*** 0.0039* 0.0138*** 
 
(0.0021) (0.0022) (0.0025) 
𝛾𝑘𝐹𝑅𝑆𝐵  -0.0179*** 0.0104*** 0.0075** 
 
(0.0025) (0.0026) (0.0031) 
𝛾𝑘𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒  0.0004* -0.0002 -0.0003 
 
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) 
𝛾𝑘𝑀𝑎𝑛𝑢𝑓  0.0028** -0.0020* -0.0008 
 
(0.0011) (0.0012) (0.0014) 
Constant 0.0195*** -0.0005 -0.0190*** 
  (0.0027) (0.0029) (0.0034) 
Observations 19,459 19,459 19,459 
R-squared 0.0069 0.0016 0.0035 
Note: SUR estimates. Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
 
The estimates for 𝛼𝐿𝑜𝑤𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ  and 𝛼𝐿𝑜𝑤𝑀𝑖𝑑  in Table 19 are both negative indicating that the 
elasticities of substitution between Low and High and between Low and Mid are less than 1. 
Thus, it is only possible to a limited extent to substitute between these types of labour. The 
estimate for 𝛼𝑀𝑖𝑑𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ , on the contrary, is not signif icantly different from zero indicating that 
there is unit elasticity of substitution between Mid and High. The estimates for 𝛼𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ  and 
𝛼𝑀𝑖𝑑𝑀𝑖𝑑  are both positive and significant indicating relatively low own price elasticity, which 
naturally follows from limited substitutability. There is no estimate for 𝛼𝐿𝑜𝑤𝐿𝑜𝑤  in the model but  
in terms of magnitude, it is implied to be relatively high. 11 Two of the 𝛼𝑘𝑌  parameter estimates 
are significantly different from zero indicating that the production function is not homothetic: 
the three types of labour do not increase in equal proportions as firms grow. Growing firms 
shift labour from Low to Mid, which in addition entails that there cannot be constant returns to 
scale. 
The first three columns in Table 20 contain the result from estimating equation 4 while the last 
three columns contain the result from adding interactions between the technology variables 
and the dummies for SB firms. As with Table 19, the elasticities of substitution and own price 
elasticities have not been computed but the estimates in the first part of Table 20 imply unit 
elasticity of substitution between High and Mid and between High and Low, but less than unit 
elasticity between Mid and Low. This means that jobs of type High can be substituted with 
                                        
11  𝛼𝐿𝑜𝑤𝐿𝑜𝑤̂ =  0 − 𝛼𝐿𝑜𝑤𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ̂ − 𝛼𝐿𝑜𝑤𝑀𝑖𝑑̂ = 0.09 + 0.0937 = 0.1837 
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either of the other two types of labour while types Mid and Low are complements and hence 
can only substitute for each other to a limited degree. Relatedly, the own price elasticity of 
type High appears to be higher than the own price elasticity of the other types. 
Unlike the results in Table 19, the effect of sales growth is zero across all three equations 
implying that production is homothetic. This means that, as sales change, the use of a ll three 
types of labour change in equal proportions, though not necessarily in the same proportion as 
sales. 
Focus now turns to the main parameters of interest: the beta parameters reflecting 
complementarities between different aspects of technology and the types of jobs. The estimate 
for imports for type Mid is positive and significant meaning that as firms import more they also 
employ more type Mid labour. There is no corresponding negative estimate, but when the Mid 
share goes up others must go down. In as much as importing ref lects some degree of 
offshoring, this result was unexpected as it means that offshoring counteracts polarization in 
jobs. Organisational innovation involving external relations and organisational innovation 
involving work organisation are also both complementary to type Mid, while product innovation 
and organisational change involving formal structure substitutes for type Mid. External linkages 
were expected to indicate outsourcing and hence expected to lead to polarization instead of 
counteracting it, as the results indicate. Changes in formal structure appear to contribute to 
polarization. This means that firms implement practices, such as quality control, knowledge 
management and supply chain management whereby Mid occupations become superfluous. 
The results do not indicate whether it is type High or Low that increases in response. Changes 
in work organisation appear to be part of the explanation for general upgrading. In other 
words, implementing a team structure and decentralising decision-making upgrades jobs from 
type Low to type Mid. Finally, the results show that marketing innovation increases the use of 
Low at the expense of both other types. That is, new marketing initiatives require type Low 
workers, which thus increase in the share of employment. Summing up, these first results 
seem to be just as good at explaining polarization as they are at explaining general upgrading, 
while it is general upgrading, which is observed in the averages of the dependent variables. In 
addition, the coefficient of determination is quite low for all equations. Therefore, we add 
interactions between the SB dummies and the technology indicators to better explain the 
sources of polarization. The result is presented in the last three columns of Table 20. 
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Table 20 – Estimates for complementarity and substitutability of technology and labour 
  Equation 4 Equation 4 w/ interactions 
Parameter High Mid Low High Mid Low 
𝛼𝑘𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ  0.0986 -0.0021 -0.0965 -0.0030 0.0434 -0.0404 
 
(0.0925) (0.0576) (0.0927) (0.0939) (0.0582) (0.0941) 
𝛼𝑘𝑀𝑖𝑑  -0.0021 0.2308*** -0.2287*** 0.0434 0.1618** -0.2052*** 
 
(0.0576) (0.0694) (0.0754) (0.0582) (0.0701) (0.0763) 
𝛼𝑘𝑌  0.0004 0.0009 -0.0014 0.0000 0.0011 -0.0012 
  (0.0011) (0.0010) (0.0013) (0.0011) (0.0010) (0.0013) 
𝛽𝑘𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡  -0.0001 0.0001 -0.0001 0.0339*** 0.0041 -0.0381*** 
 
(0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0084) (0.0080) (0.0102) 
𝛽𝑘𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡  0.0002 0.0008** -0.001* 0.0234** -0.0065 -0.0169 
 
(0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0104) (0.0099) (0.0127) 
𝛽𝑘𝑅&𝐷  -0.0005 0.0020 -0.0015 0.0089* 0.0013 -0.0103 
 
(0.0013) (0.0013) (0.0016) (0.0051) (0.0048) (0.0062) 
𝛽𝑘𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑑  -0.0033 -0.0043* 0.0076** -0.0323*** -0.0194** 0.0517*** 
 
(0.0026) (0.0025) (0.0032) (0.0101) (0.0096) (0.0123) 
𝛽𝑘𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑐  -0.0013 0.0038 -0.0025 -0.0954*** -0.0356* 0.1309*** 
 
(0.0029) (0.0028) (0.0035) (0.0220) (0.0209) (0.0269) 
𝛽𝑘𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒 𝑡  -0.0061** -0.0065** 0.0126*** -0.0226** 0.0104 0.0122** 
 
(0.0027) (0.0025) (0.0032) (0.0113) (0.0108) (0.0139) 
𝛽𝑘𝑂𝑟𝑔𝐸𝑥𝑡  -0.0021 0.0046* -0.0025 -0.0253*** 0.0489*** -0.0237 
 
(0.0028) (0.0027) (0.0034) (0.0095) (0.0091) (0.0116) 
𝛽𝑘𝑂𝑟𝑔𝐹𝑜𝑟  0.0041 -0.0065** 0.0024 0.0562*** -0.0073 -0.0489** 
 
(0.0031) (0.0029) (0.0037) (0.0186) (0.0177) (0.0228) 
𝛽𝑘𝑂𝑟𝑔𝑊𝑟𝑘  0.0029 0.0081*** -0.0111*** 0.1003*** -0.0086 -0.0917*** 
 
(0.0031) (0.0030) (0.0038) (0.0201) (0.0191) (0.0245) 
𝛾𝑘𝑁𝑂𝑆 𝐵  -0.0175*** 0.0070** 0.0105** -0.0987*** -0.0346 0.1332*** 
 (0.0036) (0.0034) (0.0044) (0.0271) (0.0258) (0.0331) 
𝛾𝑘𝐹𝑅𝑆𝐵  -0.0184*** 0.0136*** 0.0048 -0.0823*** -0.0621** 0.1444*** 
 (0.0043) (0.0041) (0.0053) (0.0313) (0.0298) (0.0383) 
𝛾𝑘𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒  0.0006 0.0006 -0.0012 -0.0083** -0.0023 0.0106** 
 
(0.0007) (0.0006) (0.0008) (0.0035) (0.0033) (0.0042) 
𝛾𝑘𝑀𝑎𝑛𝑢𝑓  0.0050** 0.0003 -0.0053* -0.0153** -0.0055 0.0208** 
  (0.0024) (0.0023) (0.0029) (0.0077) (0.0073) (0.0094) 
Continued next page 
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Continued from previous page 
 Equation 4 Equation 4 w/ interactions 
Parameter High Mid Low High Mid Low 
Interactions with 𝑁𝑂𝑆𝐵𝑖 
𝛽𝑘𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑁 𝑂𝑆𝐵  
   
-0.0341*** -0.0039 0.0380*** 
 
   
(0.0084) (0.0080) (0.0102) 
𝛽𝑘𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑁𝑂𝑆𝐵  
   
-0.0233** 0.0073 0.0160 
 
   
(0.0104) (0.0099) (0.0127) 
𝛽𝑘𝑅&𝐷𝑁𝑂𝑆𝐵  
   
-0.0101* 0.0010 0.0090 
 
   
(0.0053) (0.0051) (0.0065) 
𝛽𝑘𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑁𝑂𝑆𝐵  
   
0.0357*** 0.0124 -0.0482*** 
 
   
(0.0106) (0.0101) (0.0129) 
𝛽𝑘𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑐𝑁𝑂𝑆𝐵  
   
0.0928*** 0.0371* -0.1300*** 
 
   
(0.0222) (0.0211) (0.0272) 
𝛽𝑘𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡𝑁𝑂𝑆𝐵  
   
0.0176 -0.0111 -0.0066 
 
   
(0.0118) (0.0112) (0.0144) 
𝛽𝑘𝑂𝑟𝑔 𝐸𝑥𝑡𝑁𝑂𝑆𝐵  
   
0.0254** -0.0523*** 0.0269** 
 
   
(0.0100) (0.0096) (0.0123) 
𝛽𝑘𝑂𝑟𝑔𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑁𝑂𝑆𝐵  
   
-0.0571*** 0.0058 0.0513** 
 
   
(0.0190) (0.0180) (0.0231) 
𝛽𝑘𝑂𝑟𝑔𝑊 𝑟𝑘𝑁𝑂𝑆𝐵  
   
-0.1004*** 0.0173 0.0830*** 
 
   
(0.0203) (0.0194) (0.0249) 
𝛾𝑘𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑁𝑂𝑆𝐵  
   
0.0092*** 0.0021 -0.0114*** 
 
   
(0.0035) (0.0034) (0.0043) 
𝛾𝑘𝑀 𝑎𝑛𝑢𝑓𝑁𝑂𝑆𝐵  
   
0.0209** 0.0070 -0.0279*** 
  
   
(0.0082) (0.0078) (0.0100) 
Interactions with 𝐹𝑅𝑆𝐵𝑖 
   
𝛽𝑘𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝐹𝑅𝑆𝐵  
   
-0.0341*** -0.0003 0.0344*** 
 
   
(0.0087) (0.0083) (0.0106) 
𝛽𝑘𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝐹𝑅𝑆𝐵  
   
-0.0207* 0.0074 0.0132 
 
   
(0.0107) (0.0102) (0.0130) 
𝛽𝑘𝑅&𝐷𝐹𝑅𝑆𝐵  
   
-0.0030 -0.0080 0.0109 
 
   
(0.0061) (0.0058) (0.0075) 
𝛽𝑘𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑑𝐹𝑅𝑆𝐵  
   
0.0324** 0.0131 -0.0455** 
 
   
(0.0132) (0.0126) (0.0162) 
Continued next page 
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Continued from previous page 
 Equation 4 Equation 4 w/ interactions 
Parameter High Mid Low High Mid Low 
𝛽𝑘𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑐𝐹𝑅𝑆𝐵  
   
0.0958*** 0.0433* -0.1391*** 
 
   
(0.0235) (0.0224) (0.0287) 
𝛽𝑘𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡𝐹𝑅𝑆 𝐵  
   
0.0153 -0.0349*** 0.0196 
 
   
(0.0136) (0.0130) (0.0167) 
𝛽𝑘𝑂𝑟𝑔 𝐸𝑥𝑡𝐹𝑅𝑆𝐵  
   
0.0323** -0.0276** -0.0047 
 
   
(0.0129) (0.0123) (0.0157) 
𝛽𝑘𝑂𝑟𝑔𝐹𝑜𝑟𝐹𝑅𝑆𝐵  
   
-0.0383* -0.0254 0.0636** 
 
   
(0.0207) (0.0197) (0.0253) 
𝛽𝑘𝑂𝑟𝑔𝑊 𝑟𝑘𝐹𝑅𝑆𝐵  
   
-0.1068*** 0.0360* 0.0707*** 
 
   
(0.0221) (0.0210) (0.0270) 
𝛾𝑘𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝐹𝑅𝑆 𝐵  
   
0.0051 0.0083** -0.0134** 
 
   
(0.0043) (0.0041) (0.0052) 
𝛾𝑘𝑀 𝑎𝑛𝑢𝑓𝐹𝑅𝑆𝐵  
   
0.0181* 0.0136 -0.0318** 
 
   
(0.0104) (0.0099) (0.0127) 
Constant 0.0204*** -0.0075 -0.013* 0.0989*** 0.0377 -0.1366*** 
  (0.0062) (0.0059) (0.0075) (0.0267) (0.0254) (0.0326) 
Observations 2,713 
 
 
2,713 
 
2,713 2,713 2,713 2,713 
R-squared 0.0223 0.0204  0.0270 0.0617 0.0505  0.0642 
Note: SUR estimates. Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
 
The estimates for the various alpha parameters are not greatly affected by the inclusion of the 
interactions. When interpreting the betas, however, an interesting change is observed: the 
direct effect reported in the top part of Table 20 includes many signif icant effects describing 
shifts between types High and Low. The direct effects pertain to the reference category, 
domestic SB firms and their subsidiaries. For these firms exporting, importing and performing 
R&D are all complements to type High, thus upgrading the employment structure. 
Organisational innovation involving the formal structure or involving work organisation are also 
complements for type High and simultaneously substitutes for Low indicating that these 
organisational changes are part of the explanation for general upgrading among domestic SB 
firms and subsidiaries.  
The remaining four variables for innovation: product, process, marketing and organisational 
innovation involving external linkages are all substitutes for High and are found to have 
differing relationships to types Mid and Low. Thus the regression results show a number of 
factors leading to general upgrading – declining share of Low, stable share of Mid and an 
increasing share of High – of the workforce among SB firms and their subsidiaries. But the 
results also show a number of effects counteracting general upgrading; not least that both 
product innovation and process innovation decreases the shares of both High and Mid while 
increasing Low. The estimates for the interaction terms in the rest of Table 20 show the 
differences in the relationships between the job types and technology variables when 
considering the other two groups of firms: subsidiaries of foreign SB f irms and non-SB firms. 
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In both cases, the estimates are more or less the exact opposite of the estimated direct effects 
in the top part of Table 20. This means that the effects identified as leading to a general 
upgrading rather than polarization among domestic scoreboard firms and their subsidiaries do 
not pertain to other firms except for an interesting exception: R&D is complementary to type 
High jobs in foreign SB subsidiaries as well as in domestic SB firms and their subsidiaries, but 
not in non-SB firms. 
In the descriptive statistics it was noted that SB firms and subsidiaries – domestic or foreign – 
contribute to a general upgrading of the wage level and skill content of jobs from 2012 to 
2013, whereas non-SB firms show polarization. This difference is not well explained in Table 
20. In addition, the results in Table 20 have quite low R-squared - yet it is still surprising that 
internationalization, R&D and innovation are not factors that significantly affect polarization or 
have consistent effects on upgrading across the groups of firms. By using the data from the EU 
Industrial R&D Investment Scoreboard it may be possible to delve deeper into the unique 
factors that affect SB subsidiaries, but not firms that are not part of these R&D intensive 
multinational conglomerates. Specifically, we may add the effects of changes in sales and in 
R&D at the level of the parent firm. The results are presented in Table 21. 
The first three columns of Table 21 report the result of fitting equation 4 to relatively small 
dataset of only 228 SB firms and subsidiaries for which complete data are available. There are 
three differences between the model and equation 14: the dummy for non-SB firms is 
naturally excluded and variables for parent company R&D and parent company sales are 
added. The first part of the table shows that there is very low substitutability between types 
High and Low and the production function is not homothetic. 
 
Table 21 - Complementarity and substitutability among SB firms and subsidiaries 
  Eq. 4, SB firms only Eq. 4, SB firms only w/ interactions  
Parameter High Mid Low High Mid Low 
𝛼𝑘𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ  0.6320** -0.0892 -0.5429** 0.4109 0.0487 -0.4597* 
 
(0.2883) (0.2136) (0.2744) (0.3061) (0.2406) (0.2773) 
𝛼𝑘𝑀𝑖𝑑  -0.0892 -0.0188 0.1080 0.0487 -0.1024 0.0536 
 
(0.2136) (0.2928) (0.2728) (0.2406) (0.3333) (0.2893) 
𝛼𝑘𝑌  0.0313** 0.0047 -0.036** 0.0173 0.0097 -0.027* 
  (0.0145) (0.0128) (0.0165) (0.0144) (0.0133) (0.0162) 
𝛽𝑘𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡  -0.0003 0.0034 -0.0032 0.0221** 0.0058 -0.0279** 
 
(0.0027) (0.0024) (0.0031) (0.0101) (0.0093) (0.0112) 
𝛽𝑘𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡  0.0042 0.0001 -0.0044 0.0182 -0.0060 -0.0123 
 
(0.0030) (0.0027) (0.0034) (0.0121) (0.0112) (0.0138) 
𝛽𝑘𝑅&𝐷  0.0075** -0.0040 -0.0035 0.0118* -0.0014 -0.0104 
 
(0.0035) (0.0032) (0.004) (0.0062) (0.0057) (0.007) 
Continued next page 
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Continued from previous page 
 Eq. 4, SB firms only Eq. 4, SB firms only w/ interactions  
Parameter High Mid Low High Mid Low 
𝛽𝑘𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑑  -0.0102 0.0044 0.0057 -0.0256** -0.0189* 0.0445*** 
 
(0.0073) (0.0066) (0.0082) (0.0121) (0.0112) (0.0133) 
𝛽𝑘𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑐  0.0071 0.0017 -0.0089 -0.1017*** -0.0303 0.1319*** 
 
(0.0087) (0.0076) (0.0098) (0.0247) (0.0228) (0.0279) 
𝛽𝑘𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡  -0.0097 -0.0200*** 0.0296*** -0.0178 0.0094 0.0084 
 
(0.0075) (0.0066) (0.0085) (0.0135) (0.0125) (0.0152) 
𝛽𝑘𝑂𝑟𝑔𝐸𝑥𝑡  -0.0116 0.0290*** -0.0175** -0.0244** 0.0482*** -0.0238** 
 
(0.0078) (0.0068) (0.0088) (0.0105) (0.0097) (0.0118) 
𝛽𝑘𝑂𝑟𝑔𝐹𝑜𝑟  0.0146 -0.0273*** 0.0126 0.0473** -0.0120 -0.0354 
 
(0.0098) (0.0087) (0.0111) (0.0216) (0.0201) (0.0238) 
𝛽𝑘𝑂𝑟𝑔𝑊 𝑟𝑘  0.0105 0.0116 -0.0222** 0.1111*** -0.0125 -0.0987*** 
 
(0.0098) (0.0087) (0.0112) (0.0229) (0.0210) (0.0258) 
𝛽𝑘𝑝 .𝑅&𝐷  -0.0054 -0.0008 0.0061 0.0072 -0.0021 -0.0052 
 
(0.0068) (0.0061) (0.0079) (0.0081) (0.0078) (0.0094) 
𝛽𝑘𝑝 .𝑌 0.0601** -0.0384 -0.0217 0.1139** -0.0729 -0.041 
  (0.0280) (0.0246) (0.0319) (0.0504) (0.0471) (0.0573) 
𝛾𝑘𝐹𝑅𝑆 𝐵  -0.0147** 0.0148** -0.0002 -0.0833** -0.0640* 0.1473*** 
 
(0.0067) (0.0060) (0.0077) (0.0359) (0.0329) (0.0403) 
𝛾𝑘𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒  -0.0029 0.0020 0.0008 -0.0100** -0.0010 0.011** 
 
(0.0024) (0.0021) (0.0027) (0.0039) (0.0036) (0.0043) 
𝛾𝑘𝑀𝑎𝑛𝑢𝑓  -0.0023 -0.0022 0.0044 -0.0226** -0.0014 0.024** 
  (0.0061) (0.0055) (0.007) (0.0100) (0.0095) (0.0114) 
Interactions with 𝐹𝑅𝑆𝐵𝑖 
𝛽𝑘𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝐹𝑅𝑆𝐵  
   
-0.0225** -0.0019 0.0243** 
    
(0.0104) (0.0095) (0.0115) 
𝛽𝑘𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝐹𝑅𝑆𝐵  
   
-0.0152 0.0067 0.0084 
    
(0.0124) (0.0115) (0.0141) 
𝛽𝑘𝑅&𝐷𝐹𝑅𝑆𝐵  
   
-0.0048 -0.0058 0.0106 
    
(0.0072) (0.0066) (0.0081) 
𝛽𝑘𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑑𝐹𝑅𝑆𝐵  
   
0.0273* 0.0138 -0.0412** 
    
(0.0158) (0.0146) (0.0176) 
Continued next page 
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Continued from previous page 
 Eq. 4, SB firms only Eq. 4, SB firms only w/ interactions  
Parameter High Mid Low High Mid Low 
𝛽𝑘𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑐𝐹𝑅𝑆𝐵  
   
0.1059*** 0.0379 -0.1438*** 
    
(0.0266) (0.0244) (0.0301) 
𝛽𝑘𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒 𝑡𝐹𝑅𝑆𝐵  
   
0.0104 -0.0347** 0.0242 
    
(0.0160) (0.0149) (0.018) 
𝛽𝑘𝑂𝑟𝑔𝐸𝑥𝑡𝐹𝑅𝑆𝐵  
   
0.0289* -0.0223 -0.0066 
    
(0.0148) (0.0137) (0.0166) 
𝛽𝑘𝑂𝑟𝑔𝐹𝑜𝑟𝐹𝑅𝑆𝐵  
   
-0.0290 -0.0241 0.0531** 
    
(0.0236) (0.0219) (0.0262) 
𝛽𝑘𝑂𝑟𝑔𝑊𝑟𝑘𝐹𝑅𝑆 𝐵  
   
-0.1188*** 0.0394* 0.0794*** 
    
(0.0252) (0.0231) (0.0284) 
𝛽𝑘𝑝 .𝑅&𝐷𝐹𝑅𝑆𝐵     -0.0200 0.0099 0.0100 
    (0.0181) (0.0168) (0.0205) 
𝛽𝑘𝑝 .𝑌𝐹𝑅𝑆𝐵     -0.0833 0.0642 0.0190 
    (0.0579) (0.0542) (0.0657) 
𝛾𝑘𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝐹𝑅𝑆𝐵     0.0063 0.0074 -0.0138** 
    (0.0050) (0.0045) (0.0055) 
𝛾𝑘𝑀𝑎𝑛𝑢𝑓𝐹𝑅𝑆𝐵     0.0225* 0.0125 -0.0351** 
    (0.0128) (0.0118) (0.0143) 
Constant 0.0397** -0.0138 -0.0259 0.1065*** 0.0338 -0.1403*** 
  (0.0200) (0.0179) (0.0234) (0.0303) (0.0283) (0.0344) 
Observations 228 228 228 228 228 228 
R-squared 0.2315 0.2182 0.2174 0.3829 0.3170 0.3877 
Note: SUR estimates. Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
Only the firm’s own R&D expenditures and the parent firm’s sales are found to be 
complementary to type High. However, when adding interactions (right part of Table 21) , 
exports and organisational innovations involving formal structure or work organisation are also 
complementary to the type High among domestic SB firms and their subsidiaries. Only the 
effects of own R&D, parent’s sales and organisational innovation involving formal struc ture also 
pertain to subsidiaries of foreign SB firms. 
Organisational innovation involving external linkages or involving work organisation are 
substitutes for type Low jobs among domestic SB firms and their subsidiaries, thus being part 
of the explanation for the observed general upgrading of jobs. Organisational innovation 
involving external linkages are complementary to type Mid for both domestic SB firms and  
subsidiaries as well as foreign SB subsidiaries, while organisational innovation involving work 
organisation are complementary for type Mid in foreign SB subsidiaries only. Factors that 
substitute for type Low and hence contribute to general upgrading are organisational 
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innovation involving work organisation among domestic SB firms and their subsidiaries and 
organisational innovation involving external linkages for both groups of subsidiaries.  
The results for product innovation and process innovation in tables 20 and 21 are difficult to 
explain. It appears that the two factors both shift employment t owards type Low but only for 
subsidiaries of domestic SB firms. However, this may be caused by omitted variable bias since 
the effect of product innovation and, especially, process innovation are likely to go through 
organisational changes, and as we control for organisational innovations we account for the 
effect of product and process innovation already. However, it is also possible that the result is 
valid and that innovation driven growth hence is inclusive in the sense that it not only creates 
benefits for owners and employees at the top of the wage hierarchy, but also creates benefits 
in the form of employment possibilities at the lower end of the wage hierarchy (Dutz et al., 
2011). 
 
5.5 Scoreboard employees: mobility and wages 
In this section of the report we move away from a firm-level analysis and conduct an individual 
level analysis on workers to investigate in greater detail the extent that workers in SB firms 
and subsidiaries and non-SB firms differ in terms of propensity to move and destination type of 
firm. Furthermore, it will be analysed how moving affects workers from these different types of 
firms. The longitudinal nature of the registry data allows for such a detailed investigation. 
Since the report relies on the population of private sectors employees in Denmark in 2012 and 
2013, it makes it possible to set strict sample requirements to more precisely capture 
differences that are driven by being employed (and/or moving to) SB firms or subsidiaries.  
In creating this sample, private sectors employees in Denmark in 2012 are taken as the 
starting point and it is investigated where these workers are employed the following year. To 
assure that mobility events are not driven by the exit of workplaces and firms, workers that 
work for a workplace and/or firm that closes down during 2013 are removed. Based on this 
criterion, it is possible to find just over 1.2 million workers where 12 percent work for a SB 
firm, which corresponds to the SB employment reported in Section 3. 
Some differences in labour market status between workers in SB and non-SB firms from 2012 
to 2013 can be observed (see Table 22). Non-SB workers are more inclined to change 
employer (13.4 compared to 8.03 percent); furthermore, a higher percentage of non-SB 
employees move to unemployment or have left the labour market. Consequently, total 
turnover among non-SB firm employees is higher. 
In the analysis, the sample is limited to those that have a job in the following year i.e. either 
remain in the firm or change to a new employer. A multinomial logit model is employed to 
investigate the propensity for a worker to move to a non-SB firm and SB firm contrary to 
remain in the current firm. These models are presented in Table 23. Model 1 demonstrates 
that a worker in a SB firm or subsidiary is more likely to stay in a SB firm or subsidiary 
compared to moving to a non-SB f irm. However, this worker is more likely to move to another 
SB f irm or subsidiary when the opportunity arises. This provides evidence that labour market 
function more like labour flow networks rather than labour market pools (Guerrero and Axtell, 
2013)  Furthermore, we also see some clear distinction in the human capital characteristics for 
those workers that are inclined to move to a SB firm or subsidiary. First, higher educated 
workers, those with more overall work-experience and high skilled occupations are more 
inclined to move to SB firms or subsidiaries. Less tenure in the previous workplace and age is 
negatively related to move to a SB firm or subsidiary. Thus based on these res ults, SB firms 
and subsidiaries draw on workers that appear to be in a different segment from the labour 
market.  
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Table 22 - Labour market attachment in 2013 
following year 
 
Non-SB  firm SB firm Total 
Remain in the 
same firm 
# 837,435 121,649 959,084 
% 76.33 85.77 77.42 
To another firm 
# 147,314 11,389 158,703 
% 13.43 8.03 12.81 
Unemployed 
# 24,358 2,028 26,386 
% 2.22 1.43 2.13 
Outside the 
labour force 
# 80,946 5,488 86,434 
% 7.38 3.87 6.98 
dead/missing 
# 7,021 1,267 8,288 
% 0.64 0.89 0.67 
Unknown 
# 31 8 39 
% 0.00 0.01 0 
Total 
# 1,097,105 141,829 1,238,934 
% 100 100 100 
Source: SB data and DST’s registries. 
 
This raises concerns as to what extent the workers can be compared. To deal with this problem 
a matching strategy is applied to overcome some of these problems; more specifically, 
Coarsened Exact Matching is used (Iacus et al., 2012). This approach allows us to balance 
covariates between workers that are employed in SB f irms or subsidiaries with workers in non-
SB firms. Workers are placed in a finite set of bins based on individual level characteristics. 
Following this method, a new sample is created where SB employees that cannot be matched 
with non-SB employees and vice versa are discarded. The variables used for matching are 
gender, age categories, education levels, and wage quartile. To deal with industry and regional 
variation, industry sectors (NACE-21) and region of work (NUTS 3) are also used. 
Following these criteria, a match is found for 95 percent of the SB employees and 62 percent 
of the non-SB workers, occupying 21,610 strata. Implementing CEM reduces the final sample 
from 1,169,909 to 835,100 workers. Running the multinomial analysis on this matched sample 
(Model 3 and Model 4) yield similar results although slightly weaker coefficient estimates. 
In models 5 and 6, the SB firms and subsidiaries are divided into domestic and foreign to 
investigate whether there are differences in the mobility patterns of workers.  This analysis 
shows that both forms of SB employees are more inclined to remain in the firm rather than to 
move to a non-SB firm and that the likelihood to move is mainly explained by those employed 
by foreign SB subsidiary.  Model 7, Model 8 and Model 9 create an extra category in the 
dependent variable to measure the relation between the probability to move to a domestic or 
foreign SB f irm or subsidiary. The findings demonstrate that employees in domestic SB firms 
and subsidiaries are more likely to move to a domestic SB firm or subsidiary, while employees 
in foreign SB subsidiaries are more likely to move to SB firms and subsidiaries in general, 
particular to other foreign SB subsidiaries. Thus overall, it shows that mobility is rather 
cliquish, meaning that SB employees limit their mobility pattern to within the population of SB 
firms and subsidiaries. 
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Table 24 takes the analysis one-step further and investigates the effect on wage growth. The 
dependent variable “Wage growth” is measured as changes in log wage: 𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑤𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑡 +1) −
𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑤𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑡). Model 1 in Table 24 looks at the wage growth of the full sample. Model 2 measures 
wage growth in the observations where a match between non-SB employees and SB 
employees was obtained, while Model 3 is the strongest specification where CEM Strata fixed 
effects are created, meaning that wage growth differences among matched employees are in 
focus.  All these models show that workers employed at a SB firm or subsidiary experience 
higher wage growth. In the strongest specification, this wage growth is approximately 2.8 
percent, but moving to a scoreboard firm means a wage increase of 12.5 percent or roughly a 
difference of 1.5 months of salary. Tests for interaction effects of being employed at a SB firm 
or subsidiary and moving to another SB f irm or subsidiary have been undertaken but are not 
reported as these interaction effects did not show any signif icant effects, meaning that the 
overall effect is additive. 
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Table 23 – Propensities to move to a new job 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
VARIABLES Non-SB fi rm SB fi rm Non-SB fi rm SB fi rm Non-SB fi rm SB fi rm Non-SB fi rm foreign SB 
fi rm 
Domestic SB 
fi rm CEM no no sample sample sample sample sample sample sample 
industry and region FE yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  
Scoreboard firm (any) -0.1453*** 0.4854*** -0.1339*** 0.4608*** 
     
 
(0.030) (0.078) (0.030) (0.081) 
     
Scoreboard firm (domestic) 
    
-0.1221* 0.2338 -0.1221* -0.2421 0.4986** 
     
(0.054) (0.146) (0.054) (0.174) (0.181) 
Scoreboard firm (foreign) 
    
-0.1405*** 0.5835*** -0.1405*** 0.7217*** 0.3946*** 
     
(0.032) (0.081) (0.032) (0.094) (0.119) 
Gender -0.0005 -0.1183*** -0.0104 -0.0949** -0.0104 -0.0951** -0.0104 -0.1170** -0.0645 
 
(0.007) (0.027) (0.009) (0.031) (0.009) (0.031) (0.009) (0.041) (0.047) 
age 0.0022*** -0.0479*** 0.0140*** -0.0435*** 0.0140*** -0.0437*** 0.0140*** -0.0414*** -0.0470*** 
 
(0.000) (0.002) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.004) (0.004) 
education (yrs ) -0.0034* 0.1220*** -0.0113*** 0.1161*** -0.0113*** 0.1161*** -0.0113*** 0.0938*** 0.1405*** 
 
(0.002) (0.008) (0.002) (0.009) (0.002) (0.009) (0.002) (0.011) (0.013) 
Experience (yrs) -0.0202*** 0.0109*** -0.0328*** 0.0061+ -0.0329*** 0.0063+ -0.0328*** 0.0087+ 0.0043 
 
(0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.005) (0.005) 
Tenure (in previous firm) -0.0646*** -0.0986*** -0.0588*** -0.0949*** -0.0588*** -0.0957*** -0.0588*** -0.1113*** -0.0787*** 
 
(0.002) (0.006) (0.002) (0.006) (0.002) (0.006) (0.002) (0.007) (0.008) 
wage (log) -0.4386*** -0.0307 -0.4746*** -0.0298 -0.4746*** -0.0280 -0.4746*** -0.0178 -0.0354 
 
(0.005) (0.020) (0.006) (0.025) (0.006) (0.025) (0.006) (0.032) (0.038) 
occuH -0.1323*** 0.4366*** -0.1080*** 0.4328*** -0.1079*** 0.4254*** -0.1079*** 0.3795*** 0.4894*** 
 
(0.014) (0.041) (0.018) (0.046) (0.018) (0.046) (0.018) (0.055) (0.072) 
occuM -0.0369** 0.1509*** -0.0592*** 0.1373** -0.0591*** 0.1377** -0.0591*** 0.0737 0.2288** 
 
(0.012) (0.043) (0.015) (0.048) (0.015) (0.049) (0.015) (0.059) (0.078) 
Constant 4.7657*** -3.6690*** 5.0281*** -3.7335*** 5.0275*** -3.7418*** 5.0275*** -4.2538*** -4.6795*** 
 
(0.066) (0.249) (0.083) (0.304) (0.083) (0.303) (0.083) (0.394) (0.454) 
Observations 1,169,909 1,169,909 835,100 835,100 835,100 835,100 835,100 835,100 835,100 
Pseudo- R2 0.116 0.116 0.120 0.120 0.120 0.120 0.119 0.119 0.119 
Log Likelihood -589521 -589521 -404658 -404658 -404636 -404636 -409073 -409073 -409073 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1. 
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Table 24 - Wage growth upon moving 
(1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES wage_change_log wage_change_log wage_change_log 
CEM no sample Strata FE 
industry and region FE yes yes yes 
Move to scoreboard firm 0.1550*** 0.1453*** 0.1231*** 
(0.005) (0.006) (0.007) 
Scoreboard firm 0.0472*** 0.0436*** 0.0273** 
(0.008) (0.009) (0.009) 
Gender -0.0721*** -0.0737*** 
(0.004) (0.004) 
Age -0.0055*** -0.0064*** -0.0133*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) 
education (yrs) 0.0396*** 0.0415*** -0.0005 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.003) 
Experience (yrs) 0.0121*** 0.0130*** 0.0137*** 
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001) 
Tenure (in previous firm) -0.0009*** -0.0009*** -0.0012* 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) 
wage (log) -0.4452*** -0.4324*** -0.6568*** 
(0.003) (0.004) (0.006) 
occuH 0.1714*** 0.1567*** 0.0965*** 
(0.005) (0.006) (0.006) 
occuM 0.0329*** 0.0231*** 0.0187** 
(0.005) (0.006) (0.006) 
Constant 5.0455*** 4.9179*** 8.3316*** 
(0.034) (0.041) (0.079) 
Observations 159,355 106,888 106,888 
R-squared 0.330 0.322 0.451 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1 
  
 
52 
6 Conclusions 
The general trend in the Danish economy is towards polarization in jobs, where jobs that 
are middling in terms of skills and wages disappear and High and Low jobs become more 
abundant. However, the detailed analyses in this report focus specifically on changes in 
the private sector from 2012 to 2013, which shows general upgrading of jobs, where 
Low jobs decline in share while High and to a lesser extent Middling jobs become 
relatively more abundant. This change is particularly strong among the firms that appear 
on the EU Industrial R&D Investment Scoreboard and their subsidiaries. These few 
hundred firms account for more than 10 percent of total private sector employment in 
Denmark and almost two thirds of private sector R&D in Denmark. 
The report relies on two sources of data: freely available data from JRC-B3-IRITEC, and 
registry and survey data from DST with strict confidentiality requirements. The JRC-B3-
IRITEC data show the identity of the SB firms and the domestic SB firms in Denmark can 
be seen to be household names in general. And so are many of the foreign SB firms 
undoubtedly. 769 subsidiaries of SB firms, probably including most of the domestic SB 
firms themselves, can be identified in the DST data and the confidentiality requirement 
entails that it is not possible to be more specific regarding the firms’ identities. It is 
shown, however, that SB firms and their subsidiaries pay high wages, hire relatively 
skilled employees and locate throughout the country – not just around the economic 
centres. Thus there are strong indices that SB firms and subsidiaries are desirable.12 
In the regression analysis of SB firms’ role in structural change in the Danish labour 
market a number of specific factors particular to SB f irms and subsidiaries were 
identif ied. The subsidiaries’ own R&D and the parent firms’ sales are both 
complementary to High skill jobs overall, but organisational innovations also play an 
important if complicated role. Organisational innovations that affect work organisation 
are complementary to Middling skill jobs in foreign SB subsidiaries and complementary 
to High in domestic SB subsidiaries, where it is also a substitute for Low skill jobs. 
Organisational innovation that affect formal structure is complementary to type High 
among domestic SB subsidiaries but complementary to type Low among foreign 
subsidiaries. Finally, organisational innovation affecting external linkages substitutes for 
type Low and complements type Mid in general and, for subsidiaries of domestic SB 
firms, also substitutes for type High. These differences are summarised in Table 25. 
 
Table 25 - Effects of organisational change on jobs 
  Dimension of 
organisational change 
Job type 
SB group High Middling Low 
Domestic Work Organisation Complements - Substitutes 
 
Formal structure Complements - - 
  External linkages Substitutes Complements Substitutes 
Foreign Work Organisation - Complements - 
 
Formal structure - - Complements 
  External linkages - Complements Substitutes 
Note: “Domestic” are domestic SB firms and their subsidiaries. “Foreign” are foreign subsidiaries  
 
While the effects are complicated the pattern is clear: organisational change in SB firms 
and subsidiaries upgrade jobs in Denmark. When extending the analysis to include also 
firms that are not subsidiaries of SB firms the results are qualitatively very similar, but it 
                                        
12 As far as firms and jobs are created and not just "acquired" by the SB firm or their subsidiaries. 
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is also apparent that there are a number of effects in addition to our focus on innovation, 
R&D and internationalisation that must affect the observed shifts in types of jobs. 
The econometric analyses substantiates what the descriptive statistics indicates: wages 
are higher in SB firms and subsidiaries; wage growth is higher in these firms and 
workers moving to such firms will on average experience a signif icant increase in wage. 
In addition, the SB firms and subsidiaries to some degree form a sub labour market 
within the labour market in the sense that workers exhibit higher mobility within this 
group of firms than between this group and the rest of the labour market. 
A number of interesting effects of organisational change on jobs were identified, while 
the results for the effects of other forms of innovation were less clear. Further analyses 
should explore the interaction between these factors since it seems likely that the effects 
on jobs of introducing new products, new processes or new marketing techniques are 
intertwined with simultaneous organisational changes. A second promising route for 
contributing additional details to the results would be to take into account explicitly that 
the data contain many relatively large firms with multiple workplaces. At such firms the 
effects e.g. product innovation and R&D are not likely to be observed at the same 
workplaces. They may even be in different regions. 
Polarization in the labour market is an undesirable outcome but since it was not 
observed in the data available for this report, it is not possible to advise how to avoid it. 
The data exhibited a general upgrading instead which may be a positive thing, but it 
may also be negative if framed differently: that jobs requiring a high level of skills are 
becoming more abundant relative to jobs requiring less skill can also be framed as skill 
biased change instead. The upgrading trend is particularly strong among SB firms and 
subsidiaries so assuming that the trend is deemed desirable then attracting and creating 
such firms is also desirable. The analysis presented in this report does however not deal 
with attracting or creating such firm but with changes within existing SB firms and 
subsidiaries. Based on these results domestic SB f irms are found to be the primary 
source of upgrading and, in particular, in cases where they undergo organisational 
change and have high R&D expenditures. 
SB firms and subsidiaries contribute to upgrading of skills and jobs, and therefore it is no 
surprise that they pay higher wages. However, the wages also grow at a higher rate and 
employees moving to an SB firm or subsidiary can expect a wage premium from the 
onset. Such higher wages imply that jobs at SB firms and subsidiaries are relatively 
knowledge intensive and the mobility within the group of SB firms and subsidiaries 
suggests that also knowledge flows between these firms. A challenge for policy would be 
to encourage this knowledge to flow also to the remaining parts of the economy, 
including encouraging spin-offs from SB firms to ensure that there will be domestic SB 
firms in the future too. 
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Appendix – the SUR model 
The starting point of the model is a production function of arbitrary functional form.  
Output is referred to as 𝑌. No restrictions are placed on returns to scale or substitution 
among the factors of production. The inputs are different types of labour (𝑳)  and 
technologically varying factors (𝑨) such as physical capital, organisational structure and 
external linkages. 𝑨  and 𝑳  are therefore vectors. Bold type refers to vectors in the 
following. 
𝑌 = 𝑓(𝑳 ,𝑨). (7) 
The demand for labour of type 𝑘 depends on output level, on the vector of wages (𝒘) 
and on technology. Total wage costs follow directly from summing over the types of 
labour. 
𝐿𝑘 = 𝐿𝑘(𝑌, 𝑨, 𝒘), (8) 
𝐶 = ∑ 𝑤𝑘 𝐿𝑘 (𝑌, 𝐴, 𝒘)𝑘 = 𝐶(𝑌, 𝑨, 𝒘). (9) 
The Taylor polynomial of the cost function of order two at [𝑌, 𝑨, 𝒘] = 𝟏 is then computed. 
[𝑌, 𝑨, 𝒘] = 𝟏    is referred to as the expansion point. This becomes a very tedious 
expression since it involves all first and second order partial derivatives of the wage cost 
function evaluated at  [𝑌, 𝑨,𝒘] = 𝟏. But by ignoring 𝑨  in this appendix, the derivation 
becomes much less tedious. Had 𝑨 been included it should be treated analogously to 𝑌. 
See e.g. equation 9 in Sanders and ter Weel (2000) for an example of a very long Taylor 
approximation to a cost function. Equation 10 is the Taylor approximation to the cost 
function, equation 9, ignoring 𝑨 for now. 
Ln 𝐶(𝑌, 𝒘) ≈ 𝐶(𝟎) + ∑
𝜕𝐶(𝑌,𝒘)
𝜕 ln 𝑤𝑖
ln 𝑤𝑖𝑖 +
1
2
∑ 𝜕
2𝐶(𝑌,𝒘)
𝜕 ln 𝑤𝑖 ∂ln 𝑤𝑗
ln 𝑤𝑖 ln 𝑤𝑗𝑖 ,𝑗 +
𝜕𝐶(𝑌,𝒘)
𝜕 ln 𝑌𝑖
ln 𝑌 + 
∑ 𝜕
2 𝐶(𝑌,𝒘)
𝜕 ln 𝑤𝑖 ∂ln 𝑌
ln 𝑤𝑖 ln 𝑌 +
1
2
𝜕2𝐶 (𝑌,𝒘)
𝜕 (ln 𝑌)2𝑖
(ln 𝑌)2. (10) 
The derivatives are all constant at the expansion point and so is the function itself. 
Hence, we can consider them as coefficients and rewrite equation 10 as  
ln 𝐶(𝑌, 𝒘) = 𝛼0 + ∑ 𝛼𝑖 ln 𝑤𝑖𝑖 +
1
2
∑ 𝛼𝑖𝑗 ln 𝑤𝑖 ln 𝑤𝑗𝑖 ,𝑗 + 𝛼𝑌 ln 𝑌 + ∑ 𝛼𝑖𝑌 ln 𝑤𝑖 ln 𝑌 +
1
2
𝛼𝑌𝑌𝑖 (ln 𝑌)
2 + 𝜖 (11) 
where 𝜖  is a classical error and also includes the remainder from the Taylor 
approximation. If it is assumed that given the output level, a proportional increase in all 
wages leads to a proportional increase in total wage costs, then the sum of the direct 
wage effects must equal one, ∑ 𝛼𝑖𝑖 = 1, and the sums over the interaction effects must
equal zero,  ∑ 𝛼𝑖𝑗𝑖 ,𝑗 = ∑ 𝛼𝑖𝑌 = 0𝑖 .
13  The aim is to use the cost function to estimate firms’
demand for different types of labour and the wage cost share of labour type 𝑘 can be 
computed as 
𝜕 ln 𝐶(𝑌,𝑨,𝒘)
𝜕 ln 𝑤𝑘
=
𝑤𝑘𝐿𝑘
𝐶
= 𝑠𝑘. (12) 
Writing equation 11 in terms of wage cost shares, as equation 12, taking the assumed 
parameter constraints into account and reintroducing the vector 𝑨 yields: 
𝑠𝑘 = 𝛼𝑘 + ∑ 𝛼𝑘𝑖 ln 𝑤𝑖𝑖 + 𝛼𝑘𝑌 ln 𝑌 + ∑ 𝛽𝑘𝑛 ln 𝐴𝑛𝑛 + 𝑢𝑘. (13) 
With 𝐾 types of labour and 𝑁 elements in the vector 𝑨 indexed by 𝑛 this is a system of 𝐾 
equations with identical regressors and each equation has 1 + 𝐾 + 1 + 𝑁 parameters to be 
estimated. This is a Seemingly Unrelated Regression model where the interdependence 
among the equations is created from the fact that cost shares must necessarily sum to 
one and the errors of the equations will be perfectly correlated. This means that the 
system is singular cannot be estimated.  That the wage cost shares must sum to one 
13 I.e. the cost function is homogenous of degree one in wages 
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means that ∑ 𝛼𝑘 = 1𝑘  and ∑ 𝛼𝑘𝑖𝑘 = ∑ 𝛼𝑘𝑌𝑘 = ∑ 𝛼𝑘𝑛𝑘 = 0 . This follows from the fact that a 
positive effect on one cost share must necessarily be balanced by a negative effect on 
another cost share. Thus, it is suff icient to estimate 𝐾 − 1 equations, which, contrary to 
estimating the system of 𝐾 equations, is possible. Therefore, one equation is removed 
from the system and the remaining 𝐾 − 1  equations are estimated with maximum 
likelihood. It is inconsequential which equation is excluded (Greene, 2000, p. 642). Since 
it was assumed that the wage cost function is homogenous of degree one in wages, the 
parameters of equation 13 are restricted by ∑ 𝛼𝑘𝑖𝑖 = 0 . In other words: a proportional 
increase in all wages increases total costs in the same proportion but does not affect the 
wage cost shares. In order to implement this restriction one of the wage variables is 
used as numeraire. 
In this study of the change in the demand for labour types by occupational category 
equation 13 will estimated in differenced form (Δ) . This is a common approach to 
eliminate fixed effects such as the business cycle that might affect both wage cost 
shares and the independent variables (See Piva et al. (2005) and Caroli and Van Reenen 
(2001) for examples, and Greene (2000) p. 643 for an alternative). Equation 14 is thus 
the general form of the models that will be estimated. The wage for labour type 𝑗 is used 
as numeraire. 
 Δ𝑠𝑘 = ∑ 𝛼𝑘𝑖 Δ ln (
𝑤𝑖
𝑤𝑗
)𝑖≠𝑗 + 𝛼𝑘𝑌 Δ ln 𝑌 + ∑ 𝛽𝑘𝑛 Δ ln 𝐴𝑛𝑛 + Δ𝑢𝑘 (14) 
Restrictions on returns to scale and elasticities of substitution may be imposed on the 
parameters (Christensen and Greene, 1976) but we follow and Caroli and Van Reenen 
(2001) and keep the specification flexible and follow their def inition of complementarity 
between labour and technology: if 𝛽𝑛𝑘 > 0  then there is a complementarity between 
labour type 𝑘 and the 𝑛’th variable in the vector of technology variables. In other words, 
as technology increases the demand for type 𝑘  labour increases too, so that its wage 
cost share increases.14 However, for consistency the implied elasticities of substitution 
must be identical across equations meaning that the parameters must be restricted 
across equations so that 𝛼𝑘𝑖 = 𝛼𝑖𝑘. E.g. in the equation for type High the effect of the 
wage of type Middling must be the same as the effect of the wage of type High in the 
equation for type Middling. 
A final remark about the general model is that there is still a risk of endogeneity in 
equation 14 since any shock to 𝑤𝑘  on the right side will by definition also affect the left-
hand side. This can be handled by either instrumenting the wages on the right by region, 
time and industry dummies (Caroli and Van Reenen, 2001) or by estimating labour 
shares instead of wage costs shares (Piva et al., 2005). In this report labour shares are 
estimated rather than wage cost shares in order to analyse polarization specifically.  
 
  
                                        
14 The elasticity of substitution between two types of labour can be computed as  
 𝜎𝑘𝑖 =
𝛼𝑘𝑖+𝑠𝑘𝑠𝑖
𝑠𝑘𝑠𝑖
, (15) 
while a study of scale economies would require estimating equation 6, the total wage cost function 
(Christensen and Greene, 1976). The elasticity of substitution should be interpreted as the change 
in the wage cost share of labour type 𝑘 relative to type 𝑖 when the relative wage between the two 
types of labour changes. A value greater than 1 means that if 𝑤𝑘/𝑤𝑖 increases then the costs share 
of 𝑘  decreases as substitution towards 𝑖 cancels out the effect of the wage increase, and vice 
versa: if 𝜎𝑘𝑖 < 1 then the two types of labour are complements. Thus if 𝛼𝑖𝑘 = 0 then there is unit 
elasticity of substitution between labour types 𝑖 and 𝑘 . As equation 15 shows the elasticity of 
substitution is not constrained to be constant when using a translog functional form. 
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